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This study focuses on gauging awareness of different phishing communication students 
in the School of Law, Policing and Social Sciences and the School of Engineering, 
Technology and Design in Canterbury Christ Church University and their perception of 
different phishing variants. There is an exploration of the underlying factors in which 
students fall victim to different types of phishing attacks from questionnaires and a focus 
group. The students’ perception of different types of phishing variants was varied from the 
focus group and anonymised questionnaires. A total of 177 respondents participated in 
anonymised questionnaires in the study. Students were asked a mixture of scenario-
based questions on different phishing attacks, their awareness levels of security tools that 
can be used against some phishing variants, and if they received any phishing emails in 
the past. Additionally, 6 computing students in a focus group discussed different types of 
phishing attacks and recommended potential security countermeasures against them. 
The vulnerabilities and issues of anti-phishing software, firewalls, and internet browsers 




The focus group was with computing students and their knowledge about certain phishing 
variants was limited. The discussion within the focus group was gauging the computing 
students' understanding and awareness of phishing variants. The questionnaire data 
collection sample was with first year criminology and final year policing students which 
may have influenced the results of the questionnaire in terms of their understanding, 
security countermeasures, and how they identify certain phishing variants. The 
anonymised questionnaire awareness levels on different types of phishing fluctuated in 
terms of lack of awareness on certain phishing variants. Some criminology and policing 
students either did not know about phishing variants or had limited knowledge about 
different types of phishing communication, security countermeasures, the identifying 
features of a phishing message, and the precautions they should take against phishing 
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EC3-Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre  
 
IOCTA- Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment  
 
NCA- National Crime Agency  
 
NCSC- National Cyber Security Centre 
 
GCHQ- Government Communications Headquarters  
 
MPS- Metropolitan Police Service 
 
CLP- City of London Police  
 
FBI- Federal Bureau of Investigation  
 
FCA- Financial Conduct Authority 
 
SFO- Serious Fraud Office 
 
VPN- Virtual Private Network  
 
SDN- Software Defined Networking  
 
DPI-Deep Packet Inspection  
 
GENI- Global Environment for Network Innovation  
 
WHO- World Health Organisation  
 
C and C Server-Command and Control Server 
 




GDPR- General Data Protection Regulation  
 
VoIP- Voice Over IP 
 
SMS- Short Message Service 
 
NFIB- National Fraud Intelligence Bureau  
 
URL- Uniform Resource Locator 
 
https- Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 
 
http- Hypertext Transfer Protocol  
 
TOR/Tor-The onion router  
 
CAPQ- Computer-based Anti-Phishing Questionnaire  
 
JCAT-Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce  
 
ISPS- Internet Service Providers 
 
GENI- Global Environment for Network Innovation   
 
IoCs- Indicators of Compromise  
 
AIS- Artificial Immune Systems  
 
COVID-19- Coronavirus  
 
UK- United Kingdom 
 
IP Address- Internet Protocol Address 
 





APK- Android Package Kit  
 
CNN- Convolutional Neural Networks  
 
DDoS Attacks- Distributed Denial of Service Attacks  
 
EMPACT- European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats 
 
EU- European Union  
 
TLD- Top-Level Domain 
 
OTLD- Onion Top-Level Domain 
 
CCTLD- Country Code Top-Level Domain  
 
HW- Hidden Wiki  
 
ASEAN- Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
 
ASEANPOL- National Police Organisation for Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
 
CNN- Convolutional Neural Networks 
 
APWG- Anti-Phishing Working Group 
 
CFC- Cyber Fusion Centre 
 
RATs- Remote access tools 
 
APT- Advanced Persistent Threat  
 
NFATs- Network forensic analysis flow exporter tools  
 





NLP- Natural Language Processing 
 







































The Onion Router Application (Tor which is also written as TOR) is used to access Dark 
Web. onion sites anonymising a user or a number of users when they visit. onion sites or 
a. onion site on the Dark Web. The name Tor is an abbreviation for The Onion Router. 
Tor is a software used for anonymised and encrypted communication on the Dark Web. 
Tor traffic passes through 7,000 relays which hides the location of a user. Tor network 
purpose is to protect user privacy (Islam and Ozkaya 2019).      
 
Deep Web- The Deep Web (also known as the Undernet, hidden Web or invisible net 
consists of data which is not located by search engines.  
 
Dark Web/Dark Net- is a subset of the deep web which include dark net .onion sites. 
Dark web sites mostly used for illegal criminal and terrorist activities. Dark web 
websites are not indexed by search engines. The dark web is only accessed through 
special browsers such is the Tor browser (Islam and Ozkaya 2019).       
 
 
Smishing (Texts messages which are sent by fraudsters similar to a phishing email but 
can include a link to a malicious phishing website to steal information or download 
malware onto an electronic device).     
 
Encryption is a process of converting data/information into code which can prevent 
unauthorised access from a third party. The purpose of encryption is to convert electronic 
data to unrecognisable or to an unreadable encrypted form which cannot be easily 
understood or read by third parties/ or from an individual.  
 
Spyware- Software which enables a user to gain covert information about another 
person’s computer activities by transmitting data covertly from their hard drive. The 
purpose of spyware is to send information to a third party.  
 
Viruses- A piece of malicious code which is able to copy itself and typically has a 
detrimental effect, such as corrupting a system or destroying data. A computer virus is a 
malicious software program loaded onto a user’s computer without the user’s knowledge 




Trojan Horses- A trojan horse might typically pose itself as or is embedded, in a 
legitimate programme, but it is designed for malicious purposes, such as: theft of data, 
deleting files, expanding an existing malicious botnet, spying, and carrying out DDoS 
attacks.  
 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) encrypt traffic when a user connects to the internet. A 
VPN that blocks untrustworthy networks in between which may be challenging for law 
enforcement forces to trace cybercriminals. VPN may make it difficult for digital forensics 
employees to investigate online fraud (Aragues, 2017).  
 
Remote Access Trojan otherwise known as (RAT)- Gains access to a computer system 
or mobile device remotely. A (RAT) may be installed by hackers using a piece of malware. 
This could give them total control to the attacker, who can use it to carry out a variety of 
actions: executing malicious commands, logging keystrokes, taking screen shots, sending 
files and documents to the attacker and monitoring actions.   
 
Computer Worms-A worm can be used to replicate itself over a computer network and 
performs malicious actions without guidance.  
 
Keyloggers:  Keystroke logging is an act in which tracking and recording of every 
keystroke entry made on a computer, often without the permission or knowledge of the 
user. Keyloggers might be used in software based or hardware based as a legitimate 
personal or professional IT monitoring tool. Keystroke logging can be used for criminal 
purposes. For example, keystroke logging is used as malicious spyware that may be used 
to capture private information like passwords or financial information which may be sent 
to third parties for criminal activities and exploitation.   
 
Rootkit- A rootkit is used to collect information by using different programmes that allow 
administrator-level to a computer network or a computer. This can allow the attacker to be 
granted privileged access to the computer or gain root and possibly deploy malicious 






Cybercrime- Cybercrime is a fast-paced type of transnational crime which affects 
INTERPOL’s and Europol’s member countries as well as different police forces across 
England and Wales. The growth in cases of cybercrime is because of the internet and 
computer technology which has enabled economic and social growth reliance on the 
internet. This has led to different vulnerabilities and threats from criminal activities. For 
example: ‘The Global Cybercrime Strategy outlines INTERPOL’s plan to support member 
country efforts to combat cybercrime by coordinating and delivering specialised policing 
capabilities from 2016 to 2020.’    
 
APT (Advanced Persistent Threat)- APT uses sophisticated hacking techniques to access 
a system. An APT threat is stealthy threat actors who may be nation-state or state-
sponsored groups. 
 
Botnet- A botnet is when numerous internet-connected devices which are used to run one 
or multiple bots. Botnets can be used to carry out criminal activities such as to perform 
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, steal private information, distribute spam, 
and enable hackers to access devices and its connection. The owner of a botnet can 
control the botnet and feed it commands using a command and control (C&C) software. 
The word botnet means ‘robot’ and ‘network’. The term might be associated with negative 
or malicious connotations by some people (Thingbots, 2016).  
 
Peer-to Peer Botnet- Peer-to-Peer Botnet is used to detect and terminate IRC botnets, bot 
owners might deploy malware on peer-to-peer networks. These bots might use digital 
signatures so thus only someone with access to the private key can control the botnet 
(Heron, 2007).   
 
Malware- This is an abbreviated term which means ‘malicious software’. This is software 
which is designed to gain access or damage a computer without the knowledge of a user. 
There are malware variants which include: keyloggers, viruses, spyware, worms or other 
types of malicious code that breaches a computer (Norton, 2020). Malware purpose is to 
hijack computer networks or systems in order to carry out the theft of private information 
from a device or devices. Malware has different names such as: viruses, adware, spyware, 
keyloggers and so on. Malware can be distributed by phishing variants, USB and external 





Interpol- Their full name is the International Criminal Police Organisation, and they work 
with inter-governmental organisation. They have 194 member countries and help police 
to make the world a safer place (Interpol, 2020).  
Europol- European Union’s law enforcement agency. Their main goal is to ensure Europe 
is safer for everyone and benefit EU citizens. Europol investigate organised fraud, 
international drug trafficking and money laundering, trafficking in human beings and 
terrorism.  
 
FBI- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is a domestic intelligence and security service. 
They investigate cybercrime, money laundering, drug trafficking, cyber-terrorism, 
terrorism and so on. They may work collaboratively with other law enforcement agencies 
such as: Interpol and Europol.  
 
Phishing- Phishing is when hackers attempt to gain person information using malicious e-
mails and phishing sites. Some phishing variants such as: Vishing, Smishing and Spear- 
Phishing are becoming increasingly sophisticated form of cyber-attack.  
 
Spear Phishing- Spear Phishing is a variant of phishing in which hackers send emails to 
a specific group of people with common characteristics or other identifies. Spear Phishing 
Emails appear to originate from a or trusted source such as a Europol police recruitment 
email applied previously by an individual. Hackers use spear phishing to harvest classified 
information or personal information from a victim or group of victims depending on the 
success rate of a spear phishing email sent by hackers.  
 
Honeypot- A honeypot is a term used when a computer system is intended to attract 
cyberattacks (like a decoy). It stimulates a target for hackers to exploit and use their 
intrusion attempts to gain intelligence from them and cyber-forensic experts could possibly 
find the source of the attacks launched by them (Kaspersky, 2020).   
 
WI-FI- is protected access (WPA) is a security protocol used within wi-fi networks. This is 
significant improvement on WEP because it can offer a higher level of protection through 
more sophisticated data encryption.  
 
Server- A server is a computer which can handle requests for email, data, file transfers 




Address- Identifies the location of an internet resource. This will mean that if an email 
address is a linked to an address, a web address (http:// or https:// or an internet address 
(000.111.011.0). 
 
Browser- A program used to access World Wide Web pages. For example: Safari, Google 
Chrome, Firefox or Internet Explorer. Some browsers such as the Tor browser is used to 
access dark nets or deep web sites (Islam and Ozkaya 2019).       
 
Polymorphic malware- Polymorphic malware is a malware variant that changes on a 
regular basis in order to avoid detection. The majority forms of malware can be 
polymorphic including worms, bots, viruses, trojans or keyloggers.  
 
Metamorphic virus- This malware variant is able to change its code and signature patters with 
each iteration. Metamorphic viruses are more advanced in comparison to polymorphic viruses.  
Software Defined Networking- Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a network architecture 
approach. It allows a network to be controlled or programmed using software applications. It can 
help operators to manage an entire network regularly and holistically. SDN separates a data 
plane from a control plane in routers and switches (Ciena, 2021).  
 
 
Deep Packet Inspection- Deep packet inspection (DPI) is used to examine and manage network 
traffic. DPI is a type of packet filtering that identifies, locates, classifies, reroutes or blocks packets 
with specific data or code payloads (Scarpati, 2017).  
 
 
Adaptive Dynamic Spiking Neural Network algorithm- Spiking neural networks can exploit the 
network dynamics for learning. For example, synchronisation spike trains can allow the user to 
decode the network outputs from the synchronisation patterns (Romera and  Talatchian, 2018). 
Adaptive Dynamic Spiking Neural Network algorithm have classification capabilities of spiking 
networks which are trained used to unsupervised learning methods (Ponulak and Kasinski, 2010).  
 
Network forensic analysis flow exporter tools (NFATs)- are used to monitor anomalous traffic to 
perform forensic analysis. The tools are used to get an insight of their environment. They are 
designed to gather evidence on the network and capture packets to gather evidence and analysis 





Script Kiddie- Script kiddies use software or scripts written by others and do not have the 
knowledge or know how to modify or produce their own software (HYPR, 2021).  
 
 
Elite hacker- is the name used to identify those individuals who think they are experts 
in their line of work (SecPoint, 2021). 
 
 
Recurrent Neural Network- A recurrent neural network (RNN) is an artificial network. 
RNN can be in speech recognition and natural language processing (NLP). RNNs 
created to analyse data’s sequential characteristics and use patterns to predict a 
scenario (Laskowski, 2018).    
 
 
Deep Neural Network- A deep neural network is a neural network to process data in 
complex ways. Deep neural network is a type of machine learning when the system 
uses artificial intelligence to classify and order information (Techopedia, 2021).  
 
 
Adam Optimizer- Adam is an algorithm used for stochastic gradient descent for training 
deep learning models (Brownlee, 2017).    
 
 
Stochastic- Stochastic is a machine learning process when the outcome is 
unpredictable. In a stochastic process, each event is random. A stochastic process has 
a hidden pattern that connects each of these events found from a stochastic process. A 
stochastic process decodes hidden patterns. At the end of the stochastic process, 
predications made from the decoded data (Ippolito, 2019).  
 
 
Artificial intelligence- AI-based technologies are for cyber defence. However, AI can 
automate cyberattacks. For example, to send phishing communication attacks to people 
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This study will be looking at the awareness levels of Canterbury Christ Church University 
students who are studying an undergraduate degree course in Policing Criminology and 
Computing and assessing their knowledge and awareness on different types of phishing 
attacks. There will be a focus group with computing students who will be asked open-
ended questions about certain phishing attacks from some students. Also, the 
anonymised questionnaires will be assessing the knowledge and awareness from 
students on different types of phishing communication. The study will be using a mixed 
methodology of anonymised questionnaires and a focus group. The anonymised data 
from the questionnaires and the focus group will be analysed in order to find areas the 
students’ knowledge is weakest about certain phishing variants.   
 
The study focuses on gauging awareness levels of phishing emails from students studying 
policing, computing and criminology at Canterbury Christ Church University and their 
perception of different types of phishing email and their variants with the goal of 
comprehensively answering the following research questions: 
 
Research Question 1: What are the underlying factors in which students fall victim to 
different types of phishing attacks?  
 
Research Question 2: Does the perception of different types of phishing emails from 
students correspond with statistical information in a focus group and anonymised 
questionnaires?  
 
This study aims to determine if there is a knowledge gap from undergraduate students 
and their understanding of different types of phishing attacks. Once, the lack of awareness 
of phishing variants have been identified in the study there will be recommendations made 
to the head of IT in the university in order to implement some changes to the exiting policy 
about phishing in Canterbury Christ Church University. There will be recommendations 
made to provide training to students about different types of phishing communication. By 
the end of the research the goal is to improve the knowledge and understanding of 
phishing variants from students by implementing changes to the current phishing policy at 
the university and provide training for students about phishing emails and their variants. 
A lack of awareness of phishing variants could be problematic because it may lead to 




Background Research  
 
What is cybercrime?  
 
 
Europol defines cybercrime as a technical process carried out for a multitude of reasons. 
The technical process of cybercrime is the sophisticated illegal cyber activities from 
hackers. Another technical process that is not associated with cybercrime. For example, 
an employee leaking information about an organisation by publishing personal details of 
their employees online. Motivations for cybercrime from cybercriminals could be financial 
gain, stealing personal information, damage critical infrastructure and many other 
reasons.  The nature of cybercrime has led to cybercriminals getting more aggressive with 
their cyber-attacks. Europol and its partner organisations are one of the lead cyber-
defence cross-European governmental law enforcement organisation who are protecting 
victims from cybercrime within the cyber-warfare arena against different cyber-criminals. 
Europol published the EMPACT (2018-2021) (European Multidisciplinary Platform Against 
Criminal Threats) priority. The purpose of this policy is to fight cybercrime by 1) disrupting 
criminal activities from criminals using different information systems, more specifically 
those following a ‘Crime-as-a-Service’ business model and working alongside enablers 
for online crime. 2) Combating child sexual exploitation and  child sexual abuse, which 
includes the production and distribution of child abuse material, and by 3) taking down 
and targeting criminals who are involved in fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payment; this includes mass-production of payment card fraud (which includes card-not-
present fraud), emerging new threats to other non-cash means of payment and enabling 
other criminal activities such as different phishing attacks and their variants which is the 
focus of this thesis (Europol, 2020). 
 
Cybercrime markets sell different illegal products such as hacking tools, services 
(hacking-as-a-service and fake-identity creations). Examples of cybercrime markets 
include initial access tools to a system by carrying out arbitrary operations on a machine 
to deliver payloads. Exploit kits such as Zero-Day vulnerabilities and payloads (malware) 
on the illegal markets can cause malicious behaviour. Malicious behaviour from malware 
examples is the destruction of data and data exfiltration. As-a-service offers on cybercrime 
markets such as botnets or ransomware attack tools (Ablon, 2018). Cybercrime is a 
process by which criminals target computers or use computers as tools to carry out illegal 




There are different types of cybercrime: email and internet fraud, ransomware attacks, 
and theft of financial or card payment data. The study will focus on phishing emails and 
their variants as a form of cybercrime. A phishing campaign is different types of 
communication sent to victims to give private information. Phishing campaign messages 
may contain malicious links or attachments, or they may ask people to respond with 
personal information. Another form of phishing campaign is spear-phishing. These are 
targeted attacks that try to defraud specific victims (Kaspersky, 2021).          
 
Cybercrime is a criminal activity that involves a computer, networked device or a network 
(Brush, 2020). Cybercrime is divided into two categories which are cyber-dependent 
crimes and cyber-enabled crimes. Cyber-criminals who carry out cyber-dependent crimes 
use a computer network or computer networks. For example, cyber-dependent crime is 
when an individual or a group of people gain unauthorised access into a victim’s network, 
this term is also called hacking. Cyber-enabled crimes (online fraud, purchasing of illicit 
items such as drugs, abuse videos on the surface web or on the Dark Web marketplaces 
or. onion sites) which all may be conducted online or offline, it can be conducted quickly 
and distributed at a large scale (National Crime Agency, 2020).  
 
Most cybercrime incidents fall into two main categories: 1) criminal activity that targets and 
2) illegal activity that uses computers to commit other crimes. Online criminal activities 
target computers with viruses and malware variants.  Cybercriminals may infect 
computers with malware and viruses to damage devices or stop them from working. Some 
may use malware to delete or steal data. Cybercrime that uses computers to commit other 
crimes may involve using computers or networks to distribute malware, illegal information 
or illegal images. Some cybercriminals conduct both categories of cybercrime at once. 
They may target computers with viruses first. Then they use malware on other machines 
or throughout a network (Kaspersky, 2021).  
 
Online fraud, also known as cybercrime, covers crime that takes place online. Online fraud 
committed using computers or assisted by online technology (Metropolitan Police, 2021). 
Phishing is cybercrime is a focus of this study. Phishing variants target or targets people 
by email, text message or telephone. Different phishing communication appear from a 
legitimate source to lure people into providing sensitive information (Phishing.org, 2017). 
Phishing attacks in cybercrime send fraudulent communications that appear to come from 
a legitimate source. The goal is to steal sensitive data or install malware on the victim’s 




individuals or companies. One of the negative impacts of cybercrime is financial losses 
for victims and companies. 
 
The cost of cybercrime  
 
 
Cybercrime is a national scale issue. The cost to the economy is estimated to be £27 
billion (Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office, 2020). 
According to the Office of National Statistics (2020) in England and Wales the financial 
loss from fraud varies and can be up to £40,000 or more. Crimes such as fraud are passed 
to the police for investigation by the NFIB as a case for investigation, the Force Area (with 
exception of fraud relating to the railways). The order of priorities is 1st A police force area 
responsible for the fraud investigation covering the location of the fraudulent 
operation/suspect’s address or for business related fraud the office address/place of work 
of the criminal. (The term for ‘business related’ fraud means it applies to corporate 
employee fraud, abuse of position of trust from an employer, boiler room addresses etc). 
2nd The police force area with the highest volume of individual usage of credit 
industry/banking or offences in a specific a geographic area. 3rd The police force area 
where a victim resides or works. 5th in some rare incidences that it is not possible for a 
Force Area to use these principles the NFIB will determine a force area (Home Office, 
2020).   
 
Europol (2019) stated that phishing has been around for a long time. Phishing may be 
used as a facilitator from some criminals by using a range of tactics to gather private 
information from victims. The proliferation of leaked email addresses and the increased 
numbers of phishing attempts are growing. It can lead to a surge of unique phishing sites 
detected being at an all-time high. APWG identified 225,304 phishing sites in October 
2020 (APWG, 2021).  The cost of online fraud of online scams from UK citizens who have 
shopped online and who may have experienced fraud was estimated to be £1.4 billion 
(Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office, 2020).   
 
Approximately $17,700 (£12,708) is lost every minute because of phishing attacks globally 
(RiskIQ, 2019). According to Rosenthai (2020), 75% of international organisations 
experienced a phishing attack in 2020. Verizon’s 2020 Data Breach Investigations Report 
(DBIR) found that 22% of data breaches in 2019 involved phishing because phishing 
attacks are the top threat action variety in data breaches (Verizon, 2020). The cost of a 




financial loss from a data breach from phishing attacks was from human error $3.5 million 
(£2.5 million) (IBM, 2019).  
 
Kaspersky Lab (2021) detected phishing attacks against targeted organisations such as 
banks, payment systems, global internet portals and online shopping in 2020. 18.12% 
phishing attacks globally targeted online shopping due to the growth in online orders 
because of pandemic-related restrictions (Kaspersky, 2021). Kaspersky antivirus blocked 
and detected 184,435,643 malicious phishing email attachments around the world in 
2020. The anti-phishing tool by Kaspersky was able to block 434,898,635 attempts at 
redirecting users to phishing web pages (Kaspersky, 2021).    
 
Smishing fraud or fraudulent Short Messaging Services (SMS) cases are increasing, and 
it has been reported that it has caused millions in losses among users. For example, 
losses due to authorised push payment (APP) fraud were £455.8 million in 2019. APP 
fraud can be from smishing attacks from online platforms used by criminals to defraud 
victims (UK Finance, 2020). This could be due to the awareness levels of these fraudulent 
techniques because some people may consider a text message as trustworthy. This type 
of smishing attack may result in a security attack in which the user may run into a risk of 
downloading Trojan horse, virus or other malware into their cellular phone or other mobile 
device. The financial costs of smishing according to the UK trade body UK Finance states 
that they had lost £1 million a day to bank fraud and more than £207 million in the first six 
months of 2019 alone. Smishing is a dangerous variant of phishing attacks because 
people do not expect a simple text message to be malicious. Additionally, the number of 
SMS open rates are as high as 98% which means that SMS messages are extremely 
effective in being spread globally to people which may make it lucrative for criminals (Lunn, 
2020).   
 
Online fraudsters use fear tactics within their phishing emails to defraud users. Action 
fraud had several reports from February 2020 about coronavirus-themed phishing emails 
which include malicious attachments encouraging people to click on a link or download an 
attachment. Some phishing messages may use emotional and fear appeals goal 
resembles authentic communications from companies as persuasive elements in different 
phishing emails (Workman, 2007). The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau had identified 
21 reports fraud whereby Coronavirus was mentioned, and victims lost over £800k. The 
phishing emails about coronavirus encouraged people to provide personal and financial 




research organisations associated with the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) (Action Fraud, 2020).  
 
 
According to the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) (2019) fraud victims did 
not incur any financial loss in around one in four (24%) incidents in the year ending March 
2019. This was lower than the previous year and the year ending March 2017 (both 30%). 
The majority 58% incurred a loss of less than £250, with the median loss being £167. The 
remainder 15% incurred a loss of £1,000 or more, with 2% of people in England and Wales 
losing £10,000 or more (Office for National Statistics, 2020). The threat from fraud-based 
crime on data collected in 2016-2017 from the Crime Survey of England and Wales 
revealed there was 3.4 million incidents of fraud  
 
 
The police data of up to 400,000 fraud reports may not been processed and referred to 
the police due to a 15-month long IT issue, a Which? Money Investigation revealed. 
Failure of processing of the data sharing between the National Fraud Database which is 
maintained by Cifas- describes itself as ‘the UK’s leading fraud prevention service- and 
the CLP’s NFIB. The crime reports were not automatically shared between Cifas and CLP 
from October 2018, when CLP launched a new crime-reporting service, until recently. 
According to Which? Money Investigation (2020) stated: ‘...we estimate that at least 
300,000 fraud cases weren’t referred to police since the problem began, but that number 
could easily be as high as 400,000. The year before the data feed went down there were 
high numbers of crime reports made to NFIB made through Cifas then there were from 
members of the public through Action Fraud (Which? 2020).  
 
 
Fraud cases which are recorded does not explicitly state the statistics collected by police 
forces around England and Wales. The vast majority of fraud reported to the police via 
Action Fraud is not allocated to a police force. Thus, investigation remains with NFIB with 
the purpose of intelligence (todayadvisory, 2020). Police Foundation and Perpetuity 
Research (2018) found that fraud cases are 31% of all crime. More than one-third of 
victims’ report that the impact of fraud was severe or significant for them. But this was not 





The Police Foundation and Perpetuity’s analysis of crime data and interviews with national 
and local practitioners found that the system which handles fraud reports is poorly 
structured. Fraud prevention messages are confusing. Also, the victim support services 
do not meet the specific needs of fraud victims. The research found that the police 
received 277,561 reports of fraud in 2017-18. Only 8,313 (3%) led to criminals prosecuted. 
Opportunities to investigate fraud cases can be lost. It happens when victims do not get 
updated about their fraud cases by the police. Victims’ fraud cases often are distributed 
across the fragmented network of local and national fraud prevention agencies. Some 
police forces offer limited support or no support to their local fraud victims (The Police 
Foundation, 2018 ).          
 
 
The research found different factors for police not investigating fraud cases. There are 
0.8% of the police workforce who work in specialist economic crime teams means there 
is a lack of dedicated resource for dealing with fraud.78% of the police workforce said they 
need more training to deal with fraud. 74% of police employees said they do not have time 
to deal with fraud cases. Police Foundation’s director Dr Rick Muir stated there is no 
national strategy to deal with fraud cases despite being a third of all crime.  The majority 
of police forces do not have cross-border crime such as fraud to investigate (The Police 
Foundation, 2018 ).         
   
  
Moreover, according to the chair of the Police Foundation’s strategic review of policing 
(Sir Michael Barber) stated that the public needs to change their thoughts and ‘think 
radically’ about the role of police forces in England and Wales. He stated the importance 
of police service future needs to look at various angles because the future of policing will 
change radically in a few years’ time. The current approach to policing might be suitable 
for the time being but today more and more people are affected by the negative impact of 
cybercrime.  One of the key challenges is keeping the public safe from threat actors who 
operate globally for malicious purposes. He said that police forces need to think afresh 
about their future and evolve the police workforce and how the police service is operated 
and organised (Dearden, 2020). The focus of the study is phishing and its variants. The 
definition of phishing is a board term used to describe different types of social engineering 










Phishing is a method of conducting cybercrime through the use of social engineering. 
Phishing variants attacks are carried out by cybercriminals, organised criminal groups, 
nation-states, hacktivists, malicious actors, fraudsters, and script-kiddies. Phishing can be 
used in the context of espionage, fraud, and extortion or to launch other cyberattacks 
against private or public organisations or against a group of people/an individual victim. It 
is an attack that varies in sophistication that makes the detection of some phishing variants 
challenging. According to NCSC (2020) social engineering is when a fraudster or group 
of hackers carry out specific actions in order to gain personal information, that is of some 
use for the fraudsters. Social engineering attacks has become advanced and the 
susceptibility of users becoming victims of phishing variants has increased which may 
have led to one of NCA operational priorities to evolve their intelligence of existing and 




Social engineering attacks use psychological manipulation to defraud people and trick 
them into performing actions or revealing personal information about themselves or other 
people. Different threat vectors that coexist with phishing attacks stem from different 
origins and techniques of choice from cybercriminals. Some phishing attacks features may 
target victims by mistakes they make. Interpol defines social engineering as a broad term 
used to describe scams used by criminals so that they can exploit a person’s trust for 
financial gain or to obtain classified or private information from a user to enable a 
subsequent crime. Criminals can use social media as a preferred channel, but it is not 
strange for cybercriminals to make contact by telephone or in-person with a criminal or 
criminals (Interpol, 2020).  
 
Phishing threat vectors exist from unexpected scenarios like the coronavirus pandemic. 
This particular scenario is ideal for cybercriminals who launch phishing attacks that aim is 
to destabilise victims emotionally. Baiting attacks such as pretexting within phishing 
communication may lead to some people defrauded from COVID-19 themed phishing 
attacks (Logsign, 2020). Baiting in phishing is when the victim emotions: temptation, fear 




Pretexting is a form of a phishing attack in which a person creates a phishing themed 
scenario to convince victims to provide personal information (Mason et al. 2014). Other 
forms of phishing attack vectors are categorised as a social engineering attack which are 
used to steal data like credit card numbers and login credentials. Cybercriminals goals are 
to compromise systems to gain private information such as passwords, account 
information and financial data.  Phishing attack vectors take many forms such as: email 
phishing, cloud storage phishing and mobile phishing (Align, 2018).   
 
 
Furthermore, other targeted phishing has occurred before the COVID-19 pandemic. For 
example, in September 2013, a Cryptolocker ransomware infected 250,000 computers 
from a compromised website or sent to victims from two types of phishing emails. The first 
phishing email was about a customer complaint and targeted businesses with a Zip 
archive attachment. The second phishing email had a malicious link about a problem 
clearing a check and targeted the general public. Once clicked, Cryptolocker encrypted 
files on the computer and demands the owner make a payment in exchange for the key 
to unlock and decrypt the files. Other examples of targeted phishing attacks were phishing 
kits sold on the Dark Web to cybercriminals. The phishing kits allowed anyone who 
downloaded it to create phishing emails and redirect sites that replicate well-known 
companies that collects personal and financial information from victims  (Phishing.org, 
2021).    
 
 
Phishing attacks can bypass anti-phishing software, firewalls, and domains that blacklist 
certain phishing websites. Phishing attacks use technical and social vulnerabilities to 
defraud users. The majority of cyberattacks begin with phishing variants that may 
encourage victims into malicious websites where malware might be hidden (Hong et al., 
2020). Police forces responded to the surge of fraud and cybercrime cases has increased. 
For example, malware drive-by downloads redirect victims to malicious phishing websites 
can be harmful. Victims' computers are infected when attachments in a phishing email use 
a malware drive-by download attack. The attachments could be for a job seeker’s CV 
which might be sent to a HR staff member. These attachments could have malicious 
embedded code. The most common type of malicious code used by hackers is 
ransomware. In 2017 it was found that 93% of phishing emails had ransomware 





Phishing Variants  
 
 
Interpol defines ‘Phishing, Vishing and SMShing/Smishing’ as: ‘Fake emails/text 
messages/telephone calls purporting to be from a legitimate source such as a bank or e-
commerce site are used to induce individuals to reveal personal or financial information’ 
(Interpol, 2020). Online fraud is a unique type of cybercrime because there is 
communication taking place between the victim and offender. Additionally, the majority of 
victims willingly send their personal details, money or other valuable items to criminals. 
Thus, most fraud victims should not be seen as to be passive actors in their situation; 
instead, they are an active contributor to the offence, and it is this relationship and 
interaction between the victim and the fraudster that leads to victim blaming of fraud 
victims (Fox and Cook 2011). It can be difficult to disentangle online fraud as a large 
proportion of victims do not know how their identifying information was stolen and this 
could be via cyber-identity theft, smishing, phishing emails and fraudulent calls (Roberts, 
2008).  
 
Different types Phishing emails, Vishing and Smishing will be the focus of the study which 
are fraudulent emails/text messages/telephone calls which all claim to be from a legitimate 
source such as a bank or e-commerce site are used to defraud people to reveal personal 
or financial information (Interpol, 2020). Interpol (2020) stated that COVID-19 fraud scams 
that are associated directly with the virus are: phishing emails and telephone fraud. For 
example, phishing emails are used in the COVID-19 pandemic to defraud individuals such 
as: ‘2020 Coronavirus Updates’ and ‘Coronavirus Updates’. The phishing emails target 
people who may be curious to know more information about the pandemic. The content 
of the covid-19 themed phishing emails contained attachments that distributed malware 
and ransomware or lead users to fraudulent websites to collect user credentials. The 
content of the emails were worded in a manner that they persuaded users to visit websites 
that cybercriminals used to collect personal information from victims (Cybersecurity and 









Believable phishing emails and their variants are fraudulent communication that trick 
people into believing that they are from a trusted source (Hadnagy et al. 2015). Phishing 
variants persuasive techniques used by fraudsters in different types of phishing 
communication (Tandale and Pawar 2020). The sophisticated nature of the phishing 
variants sent to victims can increase the chance of being defrauded (Ivanov et al. 2021). 
Victims of online fraud may provide their personal and financial information to 
cybercriminals and fraudsters. Fraudsters want to make money illegitimately by sending 
phishing communication to their victims. Cybercriminals use a variety of techniques to 
initiate phishing attacks-some of the phishing variants are email, social network, VoIP 
(voice phishing), SMS (smishing), malicious websites, search engines, and instant 
messaging (Smadi, Aslam, and Zhang, 2018).    
 
 
Cybercriminals use various online fraud techniques in order to steal personal information 
and money from victims. Phishing emails, identity theft and fraudulent calls (vishing calls) 
are used when cybercriminals pretend to be someone else. Additionally, online scams and 
phishing is carried out by threat actors who often create COVID-19 themed phishing 
emails impersonating government and health authorities. Cybercriminals use different 
tactics to defraud victims into providing their personal information and may download 
malicious content on their computers. According to Interpol (2020): ‘Around two-thirds of 
member countries which responded to the global cybercrime survey reported a significant 
use of COVID-19 themes for phishing and online fraud since the outbreak’ (Interpol, 2020).  
 
 
The sophistication of smishing (Short Message Service Phishing) is a text message sent 
by a fraudster or cybercriminals to persuade victims to reply to the text message or call 
the premium number in a text message. Smishing is another variation of phishing that 
involves a text message which is a text message sent on to victims’ phones to encourage 
people to call a specific phone number or log on to a Web site from a link in a smishing 
text message (Reynolds, 2011). Smishing’s purpose is to steal a user’s credentials over 
a mobile phone by clicking on a link that directs them to a fake website or redirects them 
to a  fraudulent app user interfaces (UI) through which the user gets tricked into disclosing 
sensitive information (Felt and Wagner, 2011). Cybercriminals prefer to send out smishing 
texts. Mobile phone applications ask for user credentials when a specific mobile app is 





One of the most dangerous types of phishing attacks is spear phishing emails. Spear 
phishing emails appear to be from a trustworthy source (Shakela  and Jazri 2019).   
Cybercriminals who send spear-phishing emails research the victim. The information 
about the victim can be collected from different sources such as social media information 
or public posts on social media, third-party websites and breached third-party websites 
may have some personal information about the victim (Sameen et al., 2020). Sensitive 
information shared on social networking sites can be viewed by hackers. Information 
about employees found on company websites can allow hackers to find names of a 
victim's friends, colleagues from their Facebook account, LinkedIn profile and find out 
about their hobbies and current company projects from their Twitter feed (Giandomenico, 
2020). Once specific information collected from the victim is used to send a spear-phishing 
email (Xiujuan et al., 2019). Spear-phishing emails are unique to a specific recipient and 
refer to existing information found on the internet about a victim. Spear-phishing emails 
can make the email looks official when received by the recipient (Allodi et al., 2020).  Spear 
phishing emails are more likely to be opened when they appear to be from a trustworthy 
source (Caldwell, 2013). Also, this will be looked at further within this study if some 
students fall victim to some spear-phishing emails. Students' lack of awareness from 
spear-phishing emails may be evident from the anonymised questionnaires and a focus 
group.               
  
Modification of the phishing URL of a single character can make detection difficult. Thus, 
the blacklist of phishing domains might store old phishing URLs. There is also an issue of 
targeted phishing attacks such as zero-day spear-phishing emails that may not be on 
blacklists sites. (Vayansky and Kumar, 2018). Furthermore, new phishing sites are known 
as zero-day (0-day) phishing because they will not be identified as phishing until it is on a 
blacklist phishing domain. The study found that this is a vulnerability to the blacklist 
phishing domain and can result in a phishing attack which could often take hours or 
months registered into blacklist domains. It can increase the likelihood of zero-day 
phishing attacks sent to multiple users (Aieroud and Zhou, 2017; Srinivasa et al., 2019).  
 
 
Email phishing variants are a numbers game. A group of hackers or individuals who send 
fraudulent messages can gain a substantial amount of money, even if only a small 
percentage of victims respond to phishing variants. Some hackers create phishing 
messages that appears to have come from a legitimate business. They may use the same 




a specific organisation. It does not take a long time for hackers to create phishing  
communication because phishing kits can be used  (Doupé, 2018).  
 
One of the issues with phishing attacks is it may grant criminals access to governmental 
or organisations networks which are part of a larger attack, such as an Advanced 
Persistent Threat (APT) event. APT uses sophisticated hacking techniques to access a 
system. An APT threat is stealthy threat actors who may be nation-state or state-
sponsored groups. APT hack computer networks and remain undetected for a specific 
period of time. Threat actors’ motivations could be economic or political (Kaspersky, 
2021). In this specific example, employees' personal information is compromised in an 
APT event by hackers who can bypass security perimeters, spread malware within the 
system, or gain access to secured data (Imperva, 2020). Furthermore, some people may 
find it challenging to identify phishing email variants because cyber criminals might make 
the phishing email appear official. They might be more likely to be victims of phishing email 
fraud. Also, some phishing emails can bypass and fail to be detected using conventional, 
signature-based and sender verification techniques due to new phishing style attacks that 
involve advanced social engineering techniques. Some phishing attacks do not focus only 
on stealing personal information and spreading viruses but extending to high impact data 
breaches and ransomware (Ayob and Weir, 2021).              
 
 
There are different strategies used by fraudsters to victimise individuals from phishing 
emails: syntactic (technical), semantic (social engineering) and blended (both) (Smith 
2010). Fraudsters use syntactic strategies by exploiting vulnerabilities to access personal 
data through malware such as spyware: software that allows a user to gain covert 
information about another person’s computer activities by transmitting data covertly from 
their hard drive. Viruses is a piece of malicious code that can copy itself and typically has 
a detrimental effect, such as corrupting a system or destroying data. Trojan-horses: might 
typically pose themselves as or embedded in a legitimate programme, but it is designed 
for malicious purposes, such as theft of data, deleting files, expanding an existing 
malicious botnet, spying, and carrying out DDoS attacks. Worms: in a phishing email to 
replicate itself over a computer network and performs malicious actions without guidance 
(F-Secure, 2021). Keyloggers: can be used in some phishing emails within attachments. 
Malicious spyware within the keylogger software can capture private information like 
passwords and, financial information can be sold on underground forums to third parties 




as a form of social engineering. Victims can send their personal information by being 
tricked by semantic strategies from different types of phishing emails, smishing (texts 
messages), social phishing (social network sites) and vishing (phone-calls). 
Cybercriminals use fraudulent emails or websites using official company trademarks and 
logos to represent financial institutions or an Internet Service Provider (ISP). Online 
shopping and bank themed phishing emails can be targeted by pharming attacks. An 
advanced form of phishing is pharming which redirects the connection between an IP 
address. Cybercriminals carry out pharming by breaching the Domain Name System 
(DNS) server through social engineering.       
 
 
Pharming targets a user who wants to browse to a website and its target server is a 
specific website. A user is redirected to a fake website when a user clicks on a fraudulent 
link. The user unknowingly gets diverted to a mirror website (Ivanov et al., 2021). Cache 
poisoning is used against the victim to enter their personal information can compromise 
their computer system. Pharming can also target a local machine that uses a trojan to 
modify the host file (Britz, 2013). DNS cache poisoning or DNS spoofing is an attack that 
exploits vulnerabilities in the DNS to redirect internet traffic away from servers belonging 
to a specific website and towards fake servers. Once the victim visits a fraudulent website 
hosted on a fraudulent server and enters their personal information, cybercriminals can 
sell their personal information on the Black-Market, darkweb or illegal underground 
websites. Some people may not  be aware of the hacking methods used in this type of 
phishing fraud (Aijaz,  Misbahuddin, and Raziuddin 2021).    
    
 
High technology fraud offenders are not the average person who is stereotyped in the 
media (Fox and Cook 2011). The majority of cyber criminals commit fraud for the same 
reasons that most criminals commit crimes: motive, opportunity, and rationalisation (Holt 
et al., 2015). High technology fraud offenders differ little from the average criminal in terms 
of their motivations in their methods to commit crime are different. Cybercriminals use 
electronic device/devices; some cybercriminals use both technology and criminal activity 
offline. Studies also indicate that most computer crimes are for personal financial gain, 
followed by cybercriminals needing to be intellectually challenged, to help organised crime 






Malicious techniques used by botnets are often upgraded and become complicated for 
digital forensic investigation. The majority of botnet writers may use enhanced network 
technologies and a standardised software environment. Cybercriminals may use 
advanced anti-forensic techniques which may make it challenging for a digital forensic 
investigator to conduct analysis on botnets. Cybercriminals use botnets for running 
arbitrary network services for phishing. In a phishing attack, a botnet has been used as 
servers for sending phishing emails and host phishing pages. Thus, forensic investigation 
of botnet cybercrime is fundamental to analyse bot malware and understand its 
functionality (Sarkar, 2018).  
 
 
Police forces may not have the capabilities or resources to prosecute criminals for fraud. 
Cybercriminals use TOR encryption software. TOR is used for anonymisation when 
conducting illicit activities such as sending different phishing attacks to recipient’s email 
addresses. Police forces in the UK should work collaboratively with international law 
enforcement partners in investigations involving the sale of fraudulent information. Digital 
forensic specialists in international police departments should investigate the sale of 
fraudulent data on the Darkweb and anonymisation software used by cybercriminals to 
hide their illicit activities (Europol, 2014). Furthermore, VPN is fundamental because over 
12 billion user records, including names, addresses and credit card details are stolen 
every year. By 2023, it will be 33 billion records a year (Kaspersky, 2020). There are 
different phishing countermeasures to combat malicious phishing communications.    
 
Anderson (2008) demonstrated how banks are dedicated in combating fraudulent banking 
emails by attempting to raise awareness by looking for indicators of a phishing email, but 
fraudsters are including features within an email which are advised by banks to make the 
email appear trustworthy. Banks made different recommendations to customers: ‘Check 
the English’ fraudsters amended their phishing emails by either using the banks’ own 
emails but with fake URLs or got an individual who could write English. Banks then advised 
customers to ‘Look for the lock symbol’ so when the user got redirected from the hyperlink 
from the phishing email to the phishing sites it had started to use SSL (or just forging the 
graphics of lock symbols on their web pages). The banks advised customers not to click 
on images and URLs; the fraudsters then devised a method to put in links that appeared 
to be images but were executables (Goutal, 2019). The next advice was then to check 
where a link would direct the user to by hovering their mouse over it; the fraudsters used 




used long URL (as the majority of banks also did). Fraudsters who deploy new tactics 
within phishing emails to defraud victims signify that individuals can still be defrauded even 
if they are aware of the recommendations made from banks about phishing emails. 
 
 
Most anti-phishing techniques use source code-based features and third-party services to 
identify phishing websites. These techniques can have limitations. They are vulnerable to 
drive-by downloads from phishing variants. Anti-phishing tools that use third-party 
services to detect phishing URLs can delay the classification process (Rao et al., 2020). 
Moreover, phishing websites designed to be replicas of trusted websites. Anti-phishing 
tools in usability studies showed that the server-side security indicators and client-side 
toolbars and warnings be ineffective in preventing vulnerable users from being defrauded. 
Fraudsters can use pharming which uses internet vulnerabilities based on a DNS server 
and DNS resolver.  Phishing attacks use pharming use malicious links to redirect users to 
phishing websites. Pharming phishing websites replicate websites (Sheikh, 2020). Some 
users could not know how to interpret security cues. Other users ignore anti-phishing 
toolbar warnings (Yue and Wang, 2008).       
 
 
Security tools may not eliminate all security threats and vulnerabilities from phishing 
variants, but they can detect security vulnerabilities in a system (Sudhakar and Kumar, 
2020). For example, fileless malware used by malware authors in spear-phishing 
campaigns do not download malicious files or write any content to the disk to compromise 
the systems. The attacker exploits a vulnerable application to inject malicious code into 
the main memory. In fileless malware the attacker use malware to control the 
compromised systems locally or remotely (Sudhakar and Kumar, 2020). The security tools 
can be beneficial to improve security to a certain extent. Programmers could devote more 
time to patching vulnerabilities regularly. If programmers fix software vulnerabilities, they 
can detect phishing attacks. However, it does not always happen leaves users exposed 
to sophisticated phishing attacks. Zhang et al. (2007) found some anti-phishing tools are 
vulnerable to simple exploits. Other issues with students not using security tools are 
students are prone to security threats from social and psychological aspects of advanced 
persistent threats (APT) from phishing variants. Students who are unaware of security 
toolbars cannot protect themselves against advanced malware attacks within phishing 





Some limitations of security toolbars and other browser security indictors are ineffective 
at preventing some types of phishing attacks. Wu et al. (2016) study that many participants 
did not notice the security toolbars. Other participants ignored the security warnings if the 
content is related to malicious phishing websites. Users may not check the browser’s 
security indicators regularly. Managing security might not be the users’ primary goal. 
Some users identified suspicious signs from the security toolbars, but they did not know 
how to interpret them or dismissed them. There are usability issues with anti-phishing 
toolbars. Anti-phishing tools can be used to identify the majority of fraudulent websites 
with fewer false positives but may have usability issues. The users could be vulnerable to 
phishing attacks (Li and Helenius 2007).         
 
Phishing Countermeasures  
 
 
PurplePhish provides automated phishing simulations and user awareness training to 
increase awareness about different types of phishing emails. PurplePhish can help 
students and employees to identify phishing attacks and security teams to monitor risk 
and compliance. PurplePhish can provide phishing simulation, spear phishing simulation 
and cybersecurity training. The training features can be part of staff training for employees 
and university students. IT support employees can assess employee and students’ 
susceptibility against phishing variants from advanced tracking and reporting within 
PurplePhish (Digital Marketplace, 2020).         
 
 
Police use internet evidence to document and collect digital evidence on  Internet Service 
Providers (ISPS) owning an Internet Protocol address (IP address). Digital evidence 
collected by the police used to prosecute cybercriminals. Information can be obtained on 
the receiver’s PayPal account and associated IP addresses and Identify IP ownership 
from digital forensics employees in police forces (Shipley and Bowker, 2014). Security 
functions used by digital forensics investigator’s purpose is to protect, detect, respond and 
investigate digital crime such as different phishing attacks (National Institute of Standards 







A forensic investigation method to identify fraudulent transactions from cybercriminals is 
Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) (De Sá, Pereira, and Pappa 2018). AIS inspired by the 
human biological immune system. The AIS is a self-adapted system used for credit card 
fraud detection. The case-based learning model and the genetic algorithm used in AIS 
can perform online learning instantaneously and enables the capability of fraud detection 
on online transactions. A separate study by Cavalca and Goldoni’s study (2010); (Sarkar, 
2018) demonstrated a honeypot used to collect botnet malware variants using external 
analysis providers. The malware collected and stored in the honeypot system. Then the 
stored malware are analysed by deploying external services. The investigators can create 
a database of the collected malware by the honeypot system and gather the information 
used for malware analysis that may be used for forensic analysis to reconstruct the digital 
crime incident (Sarkar, 2018). 
 
The NCSC advised organisations including educational establishments should apply a 
multi-layered set of mitigations against phishing communication. The defence against 
phishing attacks can be difficult against zero-day phishing attacks. Zero-Day phishing 
attacks are undiscovered for example until a honeypot is launched against a specific 
botnet. A honeypot is a term used when a computer system is intended to attract 
cyberattacks (like a decoy). It stimulates a target for hackers to exploit and use their 
intrusion attempts to gain intelligence from them and cyber-forensic experts could possibly 
find the source of the attacks launched by them (Kaspersky, 2020). Moreover, zero-day 
malware from phishing communication means there is no identifiable signature which can 
be detected by signature-based security platforms (Barker, 2020). 
 
 
Wright et al., (2010) research identified Test Grazioli’s Theory of Deception within phishing 
emails includes the user’s trust and web experience as two fundamental factors of 
susceptibility and deception detection in phishing emails and their variants. These are 
factors to be considered when asking focus group questions that can gauge their 
awareness levels of different types of phishing communication methods used by 








Similarly, four main reasons drive organisations or even educational establishments to 
implement a security awareness training programme. One of the reasons is compliance 
which means that regulations are effective. A reason for this could be information 
dissemination carried out to enable a larger portion of people to be aware of policies, 
news, concerns, exceptions and manage the security-related actions of employees or 
students at universities. Behaviour formulation is another factor to consider by influencing 
and managing security-related incidents of employees and students. Cultural shaping can 
create the organisations’ collective values, beliefs, actions and attitudes. They all relate to 
cybersecurity when several students could receive phishing variants from various 
methods used by fraudsters protected by cybersecurity employees and phishing 
awareness training implemented. (Carpenter, 2019). Moreover, user education is 
fundamental to raise user awareness of phishing attacks (FSB, 2020).    
 
Cascavilla et al. (2021) recommended packet sniffing to analyse data transferred between 
infected hosts and observe intrusion activities using botnets using a machine learning 
approach to monitor forums through Natural Language Processing (NLP) ML and 
leveraging Open-Source Intelligence. The use of this technique considers phishing, social 
attack, worms and DDoS. The study conducted an online investigation to determine if the 
malware steals personal information. Cascavilla et al. (2021) research used a  botnet as 
part of digital forensic analysis. It could provide investigators with an understanding of the 
intentions of online crime and online criminal behaviour. The botnet investigation 
systematically analysed data using a complex machine and deep learning investigations. 
Topic Modelling Analysis analysed and identified threats in the Surface and Deep, Dark-
Web (Cascavilla et al. 2021).        
 
There is a low number of sophisticated solutions for mobile phishing, and this could be 
due to a certain quantity of resources required to deal with the issue in mobile devices. 
Numerous apps can help prevent smishing text messages Wu et al.,(2015) highlighted 
the effectiveness of anti-phish mobile tools for Android mobile devices called MobiFish. 
Joo et al. (2017) found a smishing detection method called S-Detector gathers the logs 
and timestamp of a smishing attack. The number or URL from the smishing text message 
gets sent to a blacklist database to see if it exists. The algorithm uses an Android Package 
Kit or (APK) file downloaded as a package file format.  A package file format the installation 
and distribution of mobile apps for mobile phones with an Android operating system. A 
Naïve Bayes algorithm used to detect SMS spam once a  file has been decoded and gets 




smishing text attack (Baadel, Thabtah and Majeed, 2018). To measure the awareness 
levels of mobile anti-phish tools for Android mobile phones' people are compared in terms 
of their technical knowledge on how these applications work to prevent smishing attacks.  
 
 
A recent study by Sonowal and Kuppusamy (2018) revealed that current methods to 
detect smishing attacks are possible. S-Detector or  Smishing detector differentiates 
between text messages from smishing text messages. The software used a morphological 
analyser to extract the noun words used regularly in smishing text messages. A Naïve 
Bayesian classifier can filter text messages. The experiment result was beneficial because 
the model enabled security, real-time access and reliability in stopping most malicious 
smishing text messages and more sophisticated security threats (Sonowal and 
Kuppusamy, 2018).      
  
Internet users are encouraged to look for security measures on websites when they input 
financial or other personal information. The letters at the beginning go to the address bar 
or URL at the top of the screen should change from http:// to https:// this means that 
personal information entered and transmitted on the website is encrypted. The internet 
browser may also show that information is encrypted so no-one can intercept data.  If data 
is encrypted, there is no guarantee that the company will store the data securely. It can 
be seen as a breach of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) if personal 
information is illegally accessed, stolen or lost from the company (Information 
Commissioner's Office, 2019).       
 
According to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) (2015), banks are not responsible 
for ‘Vishing Fraud’ or Voice Phishing’. Online fraud may have a knock-on effect on the 
reputations of all businesses involved. For example, prize competitions that need peoples’ 
mobile numbers and non-secure online marketplaces. A data leak can lead to some form 
of a phishing attack (Glabbeek, 2019).  On the other hand, UK Finance stated: ‘The 
banking industry is working with mobile network operators, the Government, and different 
industry stakeholders to tackle smishing fraud’ (Lunn, 2020). A proposed solution to 
smishing fraud is awareness campaigns within the workplace, schools, colleges, and 
universities. Awareness campaigns are one way to increase knowledge and awareness 
among SMS users. However, it is not enough to deal with new types of smishing fraud 





There are some countermeasures put in place to prevent people from becoming victims 
of phishing emails. Email filtering and email authentication would prevent the user from 
being sent a phishing attack. Email authentication is the process that identifies the origin 
or domain so that ISPs can find a route for an email. It is a technique used to prevent 
spoofing and phishing attacks (Kinsta, 2021). Security tools used by some internet users 
could be phishing toolbars and indicators so that the user can identify a fraudulent website 
(Davinson, 2010). For example, a DKIM (Domainnkey Identified Mail) is a domain name 
identifier to a message. DKIM uses cryptographic techniques to validate authorisation for 
its presence (Kinsta, 2021). Email filtering is software that analyses incoming emails 
automatically and decides if they are phishing emails or not (Kastner, 2020). It can 
highlight a high awareness level from some users who use security tools to protect 
themselves from phishing attacks.  
 
CrawPhish is a tool used to harvest the source code of current and previously reported 
phishing websites. CrawPhish can automatically detect and categorise the client-side 
cloaking techniques used by phishing websites (Zhang et al. 2021). Fraudsters use 
cloaking techniques to bypass detection from anti-phishing systems. The phishing 
websites with cloaking display benign-looking content instead of the phishing page (Oest 
et al., 2018). Therefore, CrawPhish uses static and dynamic code analysis to find the 
client-side cloaking techniques used by phishing websites (Zhang et al. 2021). Another 
phishing countermeasure is FldrNmLnth. The length of a folder name of the URL’s path 
uses FldrNmLnth. FldrNmLnth is a phishing detection feature. The length of folders’ 
names of legitimate URLs on the other side did not exceed 30 characters. This difference 
in length used as a folder name length is used to detect phishing URLs (Daeef and Saudi, 
2020).    
 
Other phishing countermeasures proposed to use an email characterisation calculation by 
using a Bayesian Classifier. A Bayesian Classifier was used to identify phishing URLs 
location by a Decision Tree C4.5 (Tareek and Sunil, 2015). Pawan et al. (2010) suggested 
two methods to identify phishing websites. Introduce heuristics to find the number of 
known phishing websites and new phishing websites. Another is to use matching 
algorithms to find new phishing websites.  For example, DeepPhish is an automated 
phishing detection tool with Recurrent Neural Network. DeepPhish analyse text and 
tangential statements that are indicative of phishing attacks. DeepPhish uses linguistics 





A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) framework with 18 layers uses Alex Net. Alex Net 
is for the classification of websites using screenshot images and URLs of phishing and 
legitimate websites. CNN uses deep, feed-forward artificial neural networks. Artificial 
neural networks mean connections between nodes do not form a cycle and use different 
multilayer perceptions designed to require minimal pre-processing (Rajaram and 
Dhasaratham, 2021).    
 
 
Studies about internet bots used to research phishing are relatively current to academia 
because web crawlers are for information extraction. A botnet system such as fast flux 
botnet catcher system (FFBCS) can detect Fast-Flux (FF) domains in an online mode 
using an adaptive dynamic spiking neural network algorithm. The FFBCS showed a high 
level of detection accuracy, low false positive and negative rates (Almomani et al. 2021). 
Botnets’ detection are used for analysis such as the Network forensic analysis flow 
exporter tools like NetworkMiner, CapLoader and Wireshark. The extracted features are 
used to monitor the botnet malicious activities (Raheja et al. 2021). Other tools such as 
WC-PAD use web crawlers to crawl each webpage of a website. Most cyber-criminals do 
not index all the web links in the phished website. The experiment analysis proved that 
web-crawlers detect most zero-day phishing attacks (Nathezhtha, Sangeetha and 
Vaidehi, 2019).       
 
 
Machine learning methods might use convolutional neural networks (CNN) for high 
accuracy classification to distinguish genuine sites from phishing sites (Yerima and 
Alzaylaee, 2020). Malicious URL section and improved email filtering can block some 
phishing emails when users are using their email online. Jain and Gupta’s study (2017) 
suggested visual similarity-based approaches that compare a phishing page with websites 
using their visual similarity. However, the phishing detection approaches limitation based 
on hand-engineered image features might not apply to sophisticated phishing attacks 









Machine Learning (ML) based security framework analyse the patterns in URL strings. ML 
is used to address the drawbacks associated with list-based and content-based detection 
approaches. ML-based detection framework extracts discriminating and uncorrelated URL 
feature values from URL strings. A baseline profile is in the extraction process of the URL 
is created as a result.  The baseline profile will monitor and identify malicious URLs in real-
time. An ML-based framework is beneficial because it does not rely on pre-existing 
blacklist databases to identify malicious URLs. The ML-based framework can detect 
malicious URLs associated with zero-day phishing attacks (Kumar and Subba, 2021). 
Phishing detection at a client and server level is from a study by Lakshmi et al. (2021) 
used a phishing detection approach used a supervised Deep Neural Network with Adam 
optimizer to detect fraudulent websites from genuine websites. They identified phishing 
websites using hyperlinks available in the source code of the HTML page.   
 
 
Phishing detection tools can detect a phishing website from a web browser on the client 
slide or with specific software at the host. Phishing websites identified at the server side 
is beneficial because they have minimal reliance on novice Internet users. Search engine-
based techniques extract features in a phishing detection tool that extracts images, text 
and URLs from websites. Legitimate websites may have a higher index than phishing 
websites, which remain active for a short time. Other phishing countermeasures can be 
phishing blacklist and whitelist-based techniques. The phishing blacklist and whitelist-
based techniques blacklist malicious URLs of phishing websites or whitelist URLs of 
legitimate websites at the client or a remote server (Varshney et al., 2016).   
 
 
There is server-side and client-side detection for phishing attacks. Anti-phishing software 
contains computer code to find phishing websites. These block the content with a warning 
to the user. Anti-virus and Anti-malware are software’s that are in the client-side detection 
category.  Armano et al. (2016) found a real-time method of detecting phishing websites 
by developing an add on or extension for a browser. Server-side detection proposed by 
Hu et al. (2016) analyse server log information to identify phishing websites. The user 
when they visit a phishing webpage, the browser contacts the legitimate website for 
resources. The request is registered in a log from the official website server to identify 
illegitimate ones. Similarly, Wu et al. (2019) stated a technique that uses fuzzy logic using 




Anti-Smishing software can prevent smishing text messages: S-Detector, SmiDCA and 
Smishing Classifier which was not discussed in the focus group by the participants. S-
Detector uses a combination of content-based technique and URL based technique for 
detecting and blocking smishing messages. SMS content is analysed by checking the 
URL in a text message and smishing keywords in the text message. SMS keywords are 
analysed and classified using Naive Bayesian classifier. The URL in the text message is 
checked whether it downloads an APK file while invoking the URL. Text messages which 
contain a higher quantity of smishing keywords or a URL that downloads an APK file are 
categorised as smishing messages. SmiDCA is a smishing detection model which used: 
machine learning algorithms, heuristic methods and content- based feature extraction to 
differentiate smishing messages and text messages from non-malicious sources 
(Sonowal and Kuppusamy 2018).  
 
User Awareness Studies on Phishing Variants 
 
 
Jagatic et al. (2007) stated in their study that awareness of phishing email among users 
has increased, but so has the sophistication of phishing emails has evolved. Thus, there 
are still victims of this type of fraud. Fraudsters create phishing emails that evoke 
psychological emotions like greed and fear. The majority of spear-phishing emails target 
specific groups of people to gain their personal information. Fraudsters make a spear-
phishing email look genuine by contextualising the email by incorporating personal 
information. Users’ lack of technical knowledge to identify vulnerabilities and spear-
phishing emails is problematic (Hong, 2012; Purkait, 2012).  The data collected from the 
study found that demographics and phishing susceptibility amongst younger participants 
aged 18 to 25 performed worse than all of the other age groups could be due to fewer 
years of experience online, lower awareness of risk and less exposure to training 
materials. For instance, individuals do not know phishing email techniques used by 










Real-world phishing research studies is when researchers create a phishing email and 
sent it to people who are not aware that they are participating in a study. Real-world 
phishing research studies can assess people’s gap in knowledge and believability of the 
phishing email they have received. Overall, this shows the creative and sophisticated 
nature of real-world phishing research. For example, in Jagatic et al. (2007) phishing email 
study, over 900 university students were unaware that they were part of the study. 
Researchers used information on Facebook and Twitter to identify the friendship groups 
of the students. Half of the students received a phishing email that appears to be from one 
of their friends. This social engineering tactic used in this study is highly effective because 
of the phishing email’s social context. 72% of these students clicked on the link and 
provided their personal information.  
 
A possible solution to thwart spear-phishing is regular staff training to remind employees 
that safe email practices are fundamental. Employees in the workplace should be 
encouraged to report a suspected cyber-attack rather than ignore it. Another 
recommendation to hinder spear-phishing emails is for employers to share information 
with employees via email or the local staff intranet about the types of attack that have 
been received by other people in the organisation so that staff members will be aware of 
fraudulent emails. Employers could display examples of phishing emails on the local staff 
intranet or be sent an email about phishing emails and their variants. IT staff members 
can check phishing emails when reported by employees (Caldwell, 2013).  
 
Nonetheless, as phishing tactics become increasingly sophisticated, spear-phishing 
emails appear to be authentic. For example, attackers may include subject lines that would 
be topics of interest to the recipients to trick them into opening the message and clicking 
on attachments or links (Tehrani and Pontell 2021). Thus, organisations from different 
sectors need to consider different approaches to tackle the threat, such as training 
employees on spear-phishing and taking into account the different awareness levels of 
fraudulent emails .    
 
Pattinson and Jethat et al. study (2011) illustrated that people who are more familiar with 
computers managed to phish better than those who are not. The findings were predictable 
because people who had technical knowledge are likely to be aware of risks and 
consequences associated with phishing emails than people who do not use computers 
regularly (Pattinson and Jerram et al., 2011). It may affect the data collection sample of 




who may have no technical knowledge. Some students who may know about phishing 
variants may be aware of the risks from phishing emails. Pattinson and Jerram et al. 
(2011) study show that those who are not told before the survey that this was phishing 
study their familiarity with computers did not correlate with how they dealt with phishing 
emails. In terms of managing genuine emails, the familiarity had no significant impact on 
being a victim of phishing emails and their variants. It is fundamental to consider training 
programmes, organisational procedures, and security tools to measure awareness levels 
of different types of phishing emails and their variants (Williams et al. 2017).    
 
 
High rates of victimisation from phishing emails and their variants are because people fail 
to identify features in a phishing email (Vishwanath et al. 2011; Workman, 2008). Around 
half (54%) of fraud incidents in the year ending March 2019 were cyber-related which 
includes phishing email attacks (Office for National Statistics, 2020). It will be looked at 
further within this study by analysing, assessing and finding the weakest knowledge of 
phishing variants are from Canterbury Christ Church students’ awareness levels of 
phishing emails from anonymised questionnaires and a focus group.        
 
A study aim was improving individuals’ ability to find cues used in phishing emails from 
fraudsters (Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor and Hong, 2008). In a series of studies 
entitled the Carronade Experiments conducted at West Point, army cadets trained to 
recognise phishing emails before sending them real phishing attacks (Ferguson, 2005).  
The research found that education and training are not enough to spot deceptive cues 
within phishing emails, and it is only beneficial in the short term. Most of the participants 
were victims of the phishing attacks within four hours after the educational intervention 
(Ferguson, 2005). Thus, according to Ferguson (2005), education and training may be 
ineffective. Individuals overloaded with information about phishing emails struggle to 
process all of the information provided. It could link in with the disadvantages of student 
phishing training sessions. Some students may not remember all of the information 
provided to them about phishing attacks at Canterbury Christ Church University.      
 
Higher education establishments are targets of different phishing emails. Duo Security 
identified that 72% of UK universities which responded to the Freedom of Information (FoI) 
request had reported falling for a phishing attack (Kleitman, Law and Kay 2018). On the 
other hand, fraudulent phishing emails from Furnell’s 2013 study with Barclays Bank can 




details to cybercriminals. Another factor which could increase the likelihood of students to 
become a target of a fraud scam is the disclosure of personal information on the internet 
from online activities. The study carried out by Mesch and Beker (2012) highlights that 
students who reveal too much personal information from their online activities such as on 
social media can expose themselves to fraud, identity theft and cyberstalking.    
 
Additionally, Wang et al.’s, (2012) study draws upon the theory of deception of defrauding 
students from phishing emails. The research model suggests that the overall cognitive 
effort when processing emails decreases with attention to visual triggers and deception 
indicators in a phishing email. Visual triggers in phishing emails is making the content of 
the malicious email look similar to a legitimate email such as using similar domain names 
and visual design (Dhamija et al. 2006). Deceptive indicators in  a phishing email’s content 
creates a sense of urgency so that the user does not notice it is a phishing email (Irwin, 
2020). Other deceptive indicators in some phishing emails is email spoofing which is when 
an attacker send emails with  fraudulent sender addresses as part of a phishing attack 
designed to steal a user’s information, infect their computer with malware or request for 
money (Malwarebytes, 2021).       
 
According to the National Crime Agency’s (NCA’s) National Strategic Assessment (2018), 
social engineering is a facilitator of cybercrime because cyber-enabled fraudsters have 
limited cyber skills or are highly skilled cybercriminals. For example, cyber-enabled 
fraudsters have a range of skills. They can be a script kiddie to an elite hacker. Criminals 
predominately use previous weaknesses or zero-day exploitations by using phishing kits 
in social engineering to exploit victims in cyberspace. It may make spotting potential 
weaknesses shown in phishing emails and their variants challenging to identify. For 
example, poor grammar or spelling in emails or other phishing variants that a 
communication sent by online fraudsters is fraudulent and potentially malicious. 
Spamming and phishing are a significant threat within the cyberspace landscape is based 
upon an industry survey of 100 UK IT professionals: 75% had dealt with a security incident 
about a phishing email (NCA, 2018).      
 
The next section will explore the methodological approach by including overall description 
of the overall methodologies explored in the study, section of methods used in relation to 
the research questions, ethics approval process, participant information and data 







Qualitative and quantitative data collections methods are in the study. Quantitative 
research focuses on objective measurements, statistical or numerical analysis of data 
such as questionnaires. Quantitative research generalises groups of people to explain a 
particular phenomenon (Babbie, 2010). Qualitative research is a data collection method 
including observations, textual, interviews (individual or group) and focus groups (Gill et 
al., 2008). Qualitative research involves non-numerical data such as text, video and audio 
(Bhandari, 2020). A mixed-method approach in the study will combine quantitative data 
collection from anonymised questionnaires and qualitative from a focus group. It can be 
advantageous due to increased verifiability and a social context in answering the research 
questions. A mixed-method approach is a methodological approach that intersects mixed 
methods and combining them with other data collection methods.  A mixed method as a 
methodological technique is when a researcher uses: questionnaires and a focus group 
in their research study (Axinn, Fricke, and Thornton 1991; Edin 1999; Axinn and Pearce, 
2006).      
 
 
Mixed method data collection uses the strengths and counterbalances the weaknesses of 
other data collection methods. Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) noted that during data 
collection when the results from the strand (quantitative or qualitative) can establish data 
collection in the next strand; therefore, the two study strands are connected (Ivankova, 
2014). A fundamental principle of research mixed methods is that it is mixed in a way that 
has complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses. A mixed-method 
approach recognises that all data collection methods have limitations and strengths 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). The use of quantitative and qualitative data are usually 
combined. Thus, the findings are merged and interpreted together (Bachman and Schutt, 
2013). 
 
A mixed-method approach allows a framework to provide practical explanations. 
Therefore, some level of analysis can take place. This approach will enable a range of 
data and methods to be combined and integrated (Bryman, 2008). Anonymised data 
collected from a focus group and questionnaires will include awareness levels of phishing 
fraud from students. It can apply when gauging awareness levels of phishing emails from 
students at Canterbury Christ Church University and their perception of different phishing 




Selection of methods in terms of research questions  
 
 
Research Question 1: What are the underlying factors in which students fall victim to 
different types of phishing attacks?  
 
In the study, anonymised questionnaires with (Third year) Policing and (First year) 
Criminology and a focus group with (First year) computing students to assess the 
numerous underlying factors that may lead to some students victimised from phishing 
variants.  The aim of a survey or a questionnaire is to obtain information which can be 
analysed, and patterns extracted, and comparisons made. Questionnaires are used to 
describe a population or characteristics of that population. Data collection techniques 
appropriate to survey research are questionnaires, structured interviews, and direct, 
structured observation (Pickard, 2013). The purpose of the focus group discussion in the 
study is to gain an in-depth understanding of social issues. The method aims to collect 
data from computing students rather than from a statistically representative sample of a 
broader population of students (Nyumba, et al. 2018). Questionnaires were chosen to find 
the underlying factors in which students fall victim to phishing attack variants. Questions 
that measure knowledge was used to assess students’ familiarity with a subject. The 
questions are used to gauge students’ ability to provide informed responses (Fowler and 
Floyd 1995).  
 
Research Question 2: Does the perception of different types of phishing emails from 
students correspond with statistical information in a focus group and anonymised 
questionnaires?  
 
Perception of students about phishing variants from specific subject areas within the 
School of Law, Policing and Social Sciences at Canterbury Christ Church University and 
the School of Engineering, Technology and Design. Questionnaires can elicit information 
about attitudes that are difficult to measure using observational techniques (McIntyre, 
1999) about the students’ perception of different types of phishing emails. Also, the focus 
group will focus on the perception from computing students about phishing emails in 
general. The focus group will consider both the dialogue and the interaction (Kitzinger 
1994; Smithson 2000; Halkier 2010; Grønkjær et al. 2011) and how meaning is co-




Questionnaire Design Process 
 
 
The anonymised questionnaire will include an introductory section that will explain the 
participation of the study. The questionnaire data will be anonymised. The method of data 
collection in the questionnaire is to gauge policing and criminology students’ awareness 
of different phishing attacks. McKenna and Bargh (1994); Spears and Lea (1994) stated 
that surveys completed anonymously lead to an increased level of self-disclosure (Lazar 
and Preece, 2001). It could be beneficial to understand the underlying factors in which 
why some students fall victim to phishing variants.  
 
Paper-based questionnaires are completed anonymously from students are beneficial. 
Some benefits of anonymised questionnaires will make sure a GDPR (2016) clause is at 
the beginning of the questionnaire stating that data collected will be kept securely and 
used in a thesis without disclosing the participants’ personal information.  Another benefit 
of anonymised questionnaires is a higher response rate (Hanna et al. 2005).  
 
The questionnaires were given to third year policing and first year criminology students in 
the School of Law, Policing and Social Sciences in Canterbury Christ Church University. 
They were selected because the study wanted to assess their existing knowledge about 
cybercrime in phishing specifically. The students’ subject area might make them more 
knowledgeable about crime in general, but they may not be as knowledgeable about 
certain types phishing communication. The students in this group are ideal for this study 
because it will be interesting to see if they are aware of phishing communication which 
may be based on their prior knowledge. The results may indicate different awareness 
levels of phishing.          
 
 
The results of the questionnaire were coded and analysed in NVivo 12. The information 
was coded by typing each students' response to a question in a Microsoft Word document 
and then categorising and coding students answers to a specific question to create 
statistical data in NVivo 12. NVivo 12 was used to analyse the questionnaire responses 
from a Microsoft Word document.  A separate application called Numbers created some 





The questionnaire design had a combination of open-ended and scenario-based 
questions.  9 questions in the questionnaire ensured the students provided a detailed 
response about their awareness and knowledge about phishing attacks they may have 
encountered in the past. It will then be beneficial for analysis later on in the study which 
may find a gap in knowledge about specific phishing attacks deployed by cybercriminals. 
Emails were sent to lecturers of policing and criminology and asked if their students were 
interested in participating in the study. Dates to visit the classrooms to distribute the 
anonymised questionnaires were when the teachers were teaching their lessons.   I was 
present in the classroom when students were completing a questionnaire. It could 
increase the completion rate of the questionnaires. Also, students reassured by me that 
their responses are anonymised. It may increase self-disclosure from students about their 
awareness of phishing communication       
 
 
Scenario-based questions were about a delivery company delivering an item with a small 
charge and encouraging them to click on a malicious link and a PayPal system error 
phishing communication. The purpose of the phishing email scenario questions was to 
find more information from the students about their understanding and awareness levels 
based on fictional scenarios they may encounter in their daily lives. It can enable the 
questions to gain an insight into their understanding and identify a gap in knowledge for 
these specific types of phishing fraud scams. Additionally, open-ended questions were 
about the security precautions that some students take against phishing emails and their 
variants such as ‘SMiShing’ (SMS phishing), Vishing, Spear Phishing and Pharming.  
 
 
The purpose of security countermeasures open-ended question within the questionnaire 
was to understand the precautions that students might take against these types of 
phishing attacks from fraudsters. Moreover, another open-ended question was if the UK 
government was doing enough to make users aware of phishing emails and their variants. 
The question wants to gain an insight into the students’ awareness of information provided 
by the government about different types of phishing communication.   Another open-ended 
question was asking students what they would do if they received an email with an 
attachment. The purpose of this question was to find out if the students take the necessary 
precautions to check if an email attachment is malicious or not. The email attachment 
scenario question wanted to see if students take their time to thoroughly look through an 




A spear-phishing email scenario question included general item information such as the 
order number and date purchased. The email asked the student to click on the link on the 
email to check the delivery progress of the item they had ordered online. The spear-
phishing email question was assessing if students are aware of this type of phishing 
variant. The spear-phishing email scenario question did not want to deceive the 
participants and wanted their honest opinion about what they will do in that scenario. 
Another scenario-based question was about an email a student may receive when they 
made a purchase online during the Christmas period. The email included general item 
information such as the date of purchase and an order number. This specific type of 
Christmas phishing scenario-based question was an open-ended question that 
encouraged the students to share their honest opinion about what they will do if they 
receive this type of phishing attack communication from a cybercriminal. The Christmas 
phishing question wanted to see if some students would take precautions with the spear-
phishing email and if students know it is a spear-phishing email.    
 
 
The question design for all the open-ended questions encouraged the students to provide 
an answer to a question: 'If you answered Yes or No, please explain your answer or 
indicate that you are unsure below.' These options within the open-ended questions can 
enable me to gain an understanding of the awareness levels from the students about 
different types of phishing communication. Lack of knowledge of some phishing variants 
from the anonymised questionnaires will be questions about phishing communications. 
Mantzoukas (2008) noted that qualitative questions in surveys need three elements: 
content, coherence, and structure. Content is a question or area of interest explored. 
Qualitative questions are not interrogative sentences but are declarative sentences. The 
questions in a questionnaire will not be too focused or too broad. If some questions are 
focus on one area, the research will be inclined to follow preconceived ideas by creating 
leading questions (Lietz, 2010).       
 
 
The questionnaire will have a combination of both open-ended and closed-ended 
questions. Open-ended and closed-ended questions can give an insight into the 
awareness levels from a specific student population of Criminology and Policing students 
and what they think they know about phishing emails and their variants. Phishing attacks 
are continuously evolving and are getting more sophisticated. Cyber-criminals learn new 




personal information (Iacovos and Sasse, 2012, Kumaraguru et al., 2007, Kumaraguru et 
al. 2007). The questionnaire aims to address this factor and illustrate that phishing has 
become a severe cyber-security issue. 
 
The difficulties of questionnaire design before a research study is the unpredictable nature 
of the questionnaire results. It is a bane of every researcher. There will different factors 
considered to gauge the awareness of students about phishing communication to 
overcome the barrier. A difficulty of wording a question about phishing variants is students 
that think about the stigma of being a victim of phishing and admitting to it. Students who 
do not admit to being a victim of phishing fraud may be part of a larger number of victims 
of phishing attacks. Also, the damaging effect it has on the economy. Another potential 
difficultly in designing a phishing questionnaire is the wording of the questions. The 
questions cannot be leading or make the students believe that they are being persuaded 
or pressured into providing a specific response to a question. Some questions can be 
interpreted or perceived as being too leading or narrow and can ask a student to answer 
in a specific manner. But this is avoided in the best possible way to avoid biased results 
and get purposive results to gauge the different interpretations of phishing communication 
variants from participants of the questionnaire.   
 
It can be problematic when assessing the awareness levels of students from phishing 
emails. The questions need to ensure there is no stigma associated with their answers. 
The subject area about different phishing communication may worry students who do not 
want the stigma attached to being a victim of a phishing attack (Athanassoulis and Wilson, 
2009).  Students may claim they do not click on phishing links.  
 
Some computing students may be peer-pressured which may influence the results of the 
focus group. On the other hand, studies found that they do click on links in phishing 
variants based on data collected by NCA, National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), Action 
Fraud and various other voluntary agencies and police forces around the UK.  One of the 
challenges of designing a phishing email and its variants questionnaire is cybercrime 
range from spam-advertised commerce, botnet attacks, malware attacks sent to users 
once they click on a link on a phishing email or a variant of a phishing message. Thus, it 
may be challenging to focus on specific phishing based on scenario-based questions and 





One of the challenges of anonymised questionnaire design is: ‘phishing usually occurs 
when a fraudulent entity is disguised within an email to illustrate that it is from an 
organisation’s official email address and thus it will ask a victim for their personal 
information of their password’ (FBI, 2017).  Students admitting to clicking on a link on a 
fraudulent phishing communication variant can be challenging because of how the 
questions are worded and formatted.      
 
Alternative data collection methods can provide useful insight into the different awareness 
levels of phishing variants from the interviews with students of the research project. For 
example, unstructured, semi-structured and structured interviews could be used as an 
alternative data collection method if the questionnaire results are different.  All research 
methods have strengths and weaknesses. This study uses a mixed-methods approach to 
understand different awareness levels of phishing emails and their variants.    
 
The purpose of the questionnaire design is to ask open-ended questions to explore the 
underlying factors in which why Canterbury Christ Church students have a gap in their 
knowledge about phishing attacks deployed by cybercriminals. Data collected from the 
questionnaire wanted to understand students' awareness levels of different types of 
phishing communication. Data from questionnaires found a gap in knowledge about zero-
day phishing kits and certain types of phishing attacks from policing and criminology 
students. There was a visit to the classrooms to give the paper-based questionnaires to 
policing and criminology students when students had their lessons. It ensured that the 
anonymised questionnaires were completed and were not left to do later by the research 
participants.  
 
A questionnaire was emailed to the ethics approval committee at Canterbury Christ 
Church University to ensure the study was compliant with GDPR (2016) and the Data 
Protection Act (2018). At the beginning of the questionnaire, there was a summary of the 
study and how data collected will remain anonymised. The study included information 
about the data collection methods used, how the data will be kept encrypted/secure at all 
times, how data collected is destroyed when the study has finished, and the study's 







My university supervisors double-checked the ethics approval forms before submission to 
ensure the study followed the university policies.   Students’ identity was anonymous if 
they chose to participate in a focus group or anonymised questionnaires.  The ethics 
approval letter stated that the study followed the university policies is in the (Appendix-A 
pp.150-151) section of this study.          
 
The questionnaire encouraged students to explain their understanding of different 
phishing attacks by leaving some space beneath the questions so that students can write 
their answers. The limitations of questionnaires are the questions that only probe the 
students understanding on a surface level and do not explore the underlying factors into 
why policing and criminology students may fall victim to phishing variants. A limitation of 
the answers provided in a questionnaire is if the students have understood the question 
or read it carefully before answering a question (Hardré, 2006). An additional drawback of 
a questionnaire could be respondent fatigue. It means if the questionnaire perceived as 
too long by the students. The questionnaire could include questions that may be irrelevant 
to the student. A result of questionnaire taking fatigue can be when there is a low 
completion rate (Debois, 2019). However, a solution for this was the questionnaire 
focused on specific questions for the students to answer (Debois, 2019). Also, the 
questionnaire ensured that they were not too many questions for the students to answer. 
The questions in the questionnaire did not require the students to write a lot. Thus, 
improving the response rate of the questionnaires (Barrios, Villarroya, Borrego and Ollé, 
2011; Kiernan, Kiernan, Oyler and Gilles, 2005).        
 
 
Questionnaires gather statistical information from a specific population. It considered a 
beneficial aspect of surveys because representative samples are more reliable than small 
or non-representative ones (Kish 1965; Axinn and Pearce, 2006). The ease of web-survey 
software allows user-friendly data collection (Callegaro, Manfreda and Vehovar, 2015). 
Studies shown the advantage of text entries in web questionnaires enable participants to 
produce detailed responses.  In comparison to self-administered questionnaires (Barrios, 
Villarroya, Borrego and Ollé, 2011; Kiernan, Kiernan, Oyler and Gilles, 2005). Online 
questionnaires are convenient for participants because they can answer the questionnaire 
at their own pace can be seen as an advantage when collecting reliable data from 
questionnaires (Callegaro and Wells, 2008). Online participants can view unsolicited 
communication, invitation to participate in online questionnaires are considered 




questionnaires may have lower response rates than paper-based questionnaires. Thus, a 
paper-based questionnaire distributed to students in the study may have a higher 
completion rate (Hardré et al. 2006).       
 
 
The questionnaire has a consent details section. The consent details section includes the 
title of the research study, my contact details if students have further questions. The final 
section of the consent details is how the data collected will be anonymised. There is 
background information about the research and what participants will be required to do. 
In a separate section of the study, there will be information about how data and personal 
information of the anonymised questionnaire are kept confidential and are compliant with 
the Data Protection Act 2018, GDPR (2016) and the University’s data protection 
requirements. The questionnaire provided an opportunity for students to decide whether 
they want to participant in the questionnaire. The questionnaire has nine questions about 
scenario-based questions and open-ended questions about phishing variants deployed 
by cybercriminals. The purpose of the questionnaire is to understand their awareness 
levels, how students identify phishing communication from fraudsters and if students use 
security measures to mitigate phishing attacks.    
 
 
Focus Group Process in the Study  
 
 
Krueger and Casey (2000) believed that a focus group is less threatening to research 
participants. It was beneficial when there was a discussion about perceptions, opinions 
and thoughts about different phishing communication. The focus group aim was to 
moderate communication among participants. The goal of the focus group was to let the 
individual take the lead. As a facilitator, the discussion developed about a particular topic. 
Thus, as a facilitator, it was a marginal role. Questions prompted students to develop their 
answers about phishing variants. The focus group wanted to find how a group gives 
unique and similar responses to a particular topic about phishing.       
 
The focus group uncovered aspects of understanding different phishing variants from 
students. There was a focus on the interaction between students themselves. The 
students provided a prominence to their views about different phishing variants scenarios 




social context of the focus group provided an opportunity to witness the creation of 
meaning. It is through the interactions of participants in the group. The data generated 
from the interactive nature of the focus group offered insight. It would not be accessible 
exclusively from questionnaire data (Liamputtong, 2011).    
 
 
Different scenarios about phishing variants in the focus group provided different layers of 
meaning from personal and public information. There was an analysis of the content of 
the focus group. It provided an insight into personal experiences of different types of 
phishing communication. The focus group identified the awareness levels of students and 
their experience of phishing variants. Different scenarios provided insight into how 
students think about different phishing variants. The phishing scenarios discussed in the 
focus group gave an insight into students’ personal experiences of phishing 
communication. It allowed unique data collected from students. The focus group found the 
perceptions about phishing variants and the preventative security measures against 
phishing communication from the students.   
 
 
The purpose of asking ‘open-ended questions’ within a focus group is to find as much 
information from the students about how they dealt with a vishing call and what they did 
afterwards. It allowed me to understand the participants thought process and if the right 
preventive measures against vishing. Open-ended questions enabled the students to 
share their personal experience with vishing fraud. Also, it allowed the students to listen 
and share further insight into their encounter with vishing. The purpose of asking open-
ended questions may increase the possibility that students answer the questions about 
vishing in a detailed manner. It helped me to understand why students have been or had 
been a victim of vishing in the past.    
 
 
The focus group wanted to collect anonymised information about first year computing 
students' knowledge and perceptions about different phishing communication and overall 
understanding of specific phishing variants. The focus group wanted to understand the 
underlying factors computing students may be defrauded by phishing variants when the 
questionnaire data is compared with criminology and policing students. Some students 
could know phishing related questions. Thematic questioning in a focus group could be 




focus group can play a vital role in the research to know their awareness levels of phishing 
emails and their variants (Swaminathan and Mulvihill, 2017).      
 
 
Computing students were picked as a data collection sample because the research study 
wanted to compare their understanding of phishing communication with policing and 
criminology students and find a gap in knowledge from a specific student population. The 
focus group was in October 2020. The computing students were in the first month of their 
computing course. It may have had an impact on their awareness of phishing 
communication.   
 
 
The focus group was with first-year computing students. In the beginning, students were 
told about the anonymisation of their identity by following the  GDPR (2016) and Data 
Protection Act (2018). Students consented to have their voice recorded in the focus group 
before the focus group started. The focus group as a methodological technique enabled 
me to find gaps in knowledge in some areas of phishing attacks deployed by 
cybercriminals. The group shared their encounters with phishing variants and how they 
took security precautions against specific types of phishing attacks.   
 
 
Students did not specify how they can avoid being a victim of phishing when they 
discussed security countermeasures against phishing communication. The purpose of a 
focus group with computing students was to find out about their awareness levels of 
different types of phishing communication. Warr (2005) states that it can be difficult for 
some students to share their views if their opinions may be challenged and truncated as 
students join in or drop out of the discussions taking place in the focus group.  
 
 
A voice recording Otter is used to record the students' voices in the focus group. The voice 
recording responses are in the data collection section of the study. It allowed me to find 
gaps in knowledge from the first-year computing students at Canterbury Christ Church 
University. The focus group questions were open-ended, and the students share their 
personal experiences of phishing emails and their variants. The questions were not 
leading and did not dominate the focus group; instead, there were opportunities for the 




variant and what they would have done in that situation. The following section will include 
further information about GDPR, confidentiality, data protection storage and ethics 
committee processes in the study. 
 
 
Studies have found that the firewalls, encryption systems, authentication mechanisms or 
security certificates used by an organisation can be vulnerable to phishing attacks (Hong, 
2012). It can be applied when students in the questionnaire if students fall for sophisticated 
fraudulent communications. A limitation of asking questions about different phishing 
threats is unanswered questions from participants who may not understand. Some 
students may provide an answer to question-based on their prior knowledge of phishing 
variants. Students asked to identify phishing emails may not represent the actions of real-
world users. They are not reminded occasionally about the risks of phishing emails in real 
life (Parsons et al., 2015).   
 
The focus group covered the following topics: Scenario-based discussion asked about 
PDF document attachment from a University Lecturer,  Vishing Fraud, Smishing, Phishing 
communication from fraudsters, Prevention of Phishing Attacks and Protection against 
phishing attacks   
 
Focus Group Data Collection  
 
 
A method explored in the study is a focus group. A focus group is when students in an 
informal setting discuss their experiences of different types of phishing communication 
distributed by cybercriminals. The facilitator in the focus group ensures students are 
focusing on a topic. Detailed answers from computing students can gauge their knowledge 
awareness of phishing variants (Clifford et al., 2016). According to Kitzinger (1994), focus 
groups can be complementary. It means that students can share their experiences, 
concerns and needs. The focus group will be with computing students to gauge their 
awareness levels of phishing emails and their variants. Data collected in a  focus group 







Promoting discussion is essential in a focus group. Questions in a focus group may help 
to elicit comments made from an individual. Interpretative phenomenological analysis can 
understand what a person is thinking about from their perspective (Larkin et al. 2006).  
Questions and topics mentioned at different stages of a focus group can make analysis 
difficult because it requires trying to relate responses in various contexts and times (Lazar 
and Preece, 2001). Mantzoukas (2008) found the importance of research findings has 
value only if they provide clear answers to well-structured questions. A poorly worded 
question is unlikely to lead to another unrelated question linked to an issue. It can be 
associated with a focus group whereby effective questioning is fundamental because it 
can gain an insight into gauging awareness levels of phishing emails and their variants.        
 
 
A focus group is useful for understanding perceptions of phishing emails and their variants 
because it can provide an opportunity to evaluate interactions between participants and 
find out the underlying factors in how meaning is constructed collectively and shared. 
Different perspectives from students in a focus group will uncover underlying factors to 
extract information from them (Kitzinger 1994; Bryman 2008; Liamputtong, 2011). 
Information extracted during the focus group is awareness levels of phishing emails from 
different people. The focus group can show different awareness levels of phishing emails 
and their variants from the computing students.      
 
 
A method used to analyse focus group is discourse analysis that probes a conversation 
in search of cues that may provide a deeper understanding of phishing emails and their 
variants (Sharp, Rogers and Preece, 2007). Discourse analysis is a qualitative and 
integrative method to analyse text. It differs from systematic and content analysis. 
Discourse analysis used to focus on knowledge of phishing from students in the study. 
Discourse analysis used to consider the different ways language presents different 
understandings of a phishing variant discussed in a group discussion. Discourse analysis 
used to examine written and spoken text in the focus group (Paltridge, 2006). It was 
analysed and reviewed using a voice recorder app Otter was used to gain detailed written 
notes from participants in the focus group.  An Otter app in a focus group assessed the 
knowledge of phishing variants is weakest from computing students. The computing 
students’ knowledge about phishing attacks awareness and their understanding by using 
discourse analysis as a process. Discourse analysis will review an entire conversation and 




A group discussion interprets students' knowledge and awareness about phishing variants 
when students discuss their understanding of different phishing communication from 
cybercriminals in a focus group. Introductory remarks at the beginning of a focus group 
will outline how the focus group process will occur, including encouraging them for an 
honest, open, respectful dialogue that everyone can inclusively participate. In a focus 
group, the questions can and answered by anyone, and those who have a different opinion 
from another person will be able to share their opinion as well (Berg and Lune, 2012). 
Hennink (2014) found people share different perspectives and experiences on specific 
topics in a focus group. It will result in diverse responses recorded about phishing variants 
and what the participants do base on their personal experience.  
 
Opening questions asked in a focus group about specific topics about the research. 
General questions about phishing communication may allow the students probed for 
complete answers and encourage them to answer questions conversationally. The use of 
probes during a focus group is fundamental because it will keep the group focused. 
Students guided to the main discussion points of a group discussion. Further questions 
about phishing used to seek clarity from their knowledge and awareness of phishing.     
Questions about phishing variants to answer in a focus group can lead to an insightful 
discussion about different types of phishing attacks. It is a vital aspect of a focus group 
because data collected will be generated for analysis from students’ responses.  The 
questions at the end of the focus group will be more general and provide closure to the 
focus group. There will be a summary of the key points covered by students. Further 
questions ensure that their opinions are accurately reflected (Aurini, Heath and Howells, 
2016). Overall, focus groups can be beneficial when using group dynamics to generate 
qualitative data.  
 
Limitations of transcription from the focus group are words missing, odd phrases, 
incomplete sentences, half-finished thoughts and other characteristics of spoken word in 
a group discussion. These characteristics are associated with the flow of a conversation, 
but they may make it difficult for a reader to follow the notes. Notes are re-worded to 
ensure the sentences grammatically correct. An aspect of a focus group is an 
understanding of how participants communicate. There must be a consideration of a 
particular topic discussed. Transcription of a focus group should not be edited excessively 
and changed even if students use poor grammar or confused about a topic discussed in 





Nevertheless, survey findings may result in contradictory results. Thus, focus group 
discussions can be used after quantitative research from questionnaires to gain contextual 
information from the anonymised data used to provide examples to support quantitative 
findings in a focus group. Focus group data can enable refined explanations about topics 
covered with participants and may challenge how the data interpreted at the end of a focus 
group (Liamputtong, 2011).   
 
 
Structured interviews were not in the study as a form of the data collection method.  
Structured interviews require participants to answer pre-determined questions prepared 
before the interview. The data analysis for structured interviews can enable differences 
and comparisons made from questions asked and answers given in an interview  (Boyce 
and Neale 2006). Structured interviews include closed questions, and they would follow a 
pre-designed question. Results of a structured interview will be generalised, and the 
hypothesis tested at the end (Bowling and Ebrahim, 2005). Structured interviews were 
considered at the beginning of the study but discarded because after criminology and 
policing students completed the questionnaire, they did not want to do an interview.    
 
 
A paradigms approach is not in the study. A paradigms approach uses cross-validation to 
analyse data collected in the focus group and questionnaires (Sale, Lohfeld and Brazil, 
2002). It is a limitation of the study in terms of data collection because a paradigms 
approach was not a data collection method. Data collection can be in-depth in cross-
validation and allow strategies developed. It can reduce the chance of victims defrauded 
from different types of phishing communication methods used by cybercriminals.  The 
paradigms approach in research based on a different perspective of reality. The use of 
cross-validation can enable the gauging of awareness levels from students from phishing 
emails and their variants. Moreover, it can allow data collection to be in-depth and develop 
strategies to reduce the number of victims defrauded from different phishing 









Philosophical approaches from a theoretical perspective are interpretivism and inductive 
research. Students' views considered from a focus group and questionnaires (Creswell 
and Clark, 2007). Some aspects of subjectivism used as critical inquiry in a focus group 
about phishing emails and their variants. The focus group content is analysed and used 
as statistical analysis. Mixed methods research philosophical foundation is on a worldview 
approach (Creswell and Clark, 2007).     
 
First year Criminology and third year Policing students in the School of Law, Policing and 
Social Sciences at Canterbury Christ Church University are the sample size chosen for 
the questionnaires. The study did not focus on different departments that can provide 
insight into students defrauded from phishing attacks. A majority of students may not want 
to do interviews after completed the questionnaire when prompted at the end of it. It can 
be due to numerous factors. A potential challenge of questionnaire research enough 
people are responding to the questionnaires (Lazar, Feng and Hochheiser, 2015). The 
limitation of a focus group and questionnaires is students need to recall their perceptions 
and experience of a specific topic. Thus, they mention what they remember (Lazar, Feng 
and Hochheiser, 2015).  The anonymised data collected from the focus group with 
computing students in Canterbury Christ Church University found that some students 
experienced phishing attacks from fraudsters in the past.  
 
As part of exploratory research, the design is to gauge awareness levels of phishing 
emails and their variants based on addressing potential research problems. There are 
strategies implemented to address these challenges. Whether chosen data collection 
methods could have equal or unequal weighting and how the data collection methods are 
mixed. A rationale to use quantitative and qualitative data can find where the awareness 
of phishing attacks is weakest within the research study. The qualitative data and their 
analysis explain and provide statistical results. It will explore students’ view about phishing 
variants in more detail and explore the underlying factors which why they are victims of 
phishing attacks (Rossman and Wilson, 1985; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Creswell, 










The data collected from the focus group can use an interpretivist approach.  An 
interpretivist approach could assess the awareness levels of policing students who may 
know about law enforcement agencies that can block specific domains or websites that 
source malware using Domain System (DNS) blocking/filtering. It can prevent phishing 
activity that uses domain ‘spoofing’ when an email appears to be from a specific sender 
such as a bank or government department, but it is fraudulent. An interpretivist approach 
can understand if students are aware of prevention strategies. Prevention strategies 
protect users from email verification systems within government networks,  online banking, 
other websites reduce the possibility of people defrauded by online fraudsters (National 
Security and Intelligence et al. 2016).   
 
A study carried out by Sheng et al. (2010) found that phishing education can help reduce 
users’ tendency to become victims. Educational initiatives can increase phishing 
awareness (Arachchilage and Love, 2013; Arachchilage and Love, 2014). Phishing 
threats can have negative consequences for victims who may receive different types of 
phishing communication sent by fraudsters. Educational training sessions might provide 
the skills to reduce the chances of university students victimised by phishing variants. 
Recent research has shown education as a strategy for intervention against phishing 
variants can decrease vulnerability amongst users (Qabajeh et al. 2018; Alsharnouby et 
al. 2015). Similarly, studies found knowledge and suspiciousness about phishing 
communications could reduce the chance of both younger and older adults defrauded 
from phishing variants (Nmachi and Win, 2021). The results section of the study will 
explore the different types of phishing communication and considers educational initiatives 
based on the results. The results section will answer the following research questions: 
Research Question 1: What are the underlying factors in which students fall victim to 
different types of phishing attacks? This will be explored and analysed from the 
anonymised questionnaire results. Research Question 2: Does the perception of different 
types of phishing emails from students correspond with statistical information in a focus 
group and anonymised questionnaires? The perception of phishing variants will be 












The focus group was with six first year computing students. Six students picked from 
random sampling. All of the computing students allowed to take part in the study. The 
effect the selection method made on the results from these students is not being selective 
on students existing knowledge different phishing communication.  It made the results 
unbiased because the computing students are picked at random. They were asked 
different questions and were allowed additional time to elaborate on specific phishing 
communications in a group discussion. Computing students are given a brief description 
at the beginning of the focus group about the study and what it entailed. At the beginning 
of the focus group, students made aware that their identity remains anonymous, and data 
collected for the study will be anonymised and kept confidential. A choice is given to 
students if they are not happy to participate at the beginning of the focus group can leave 
the focus group.  Students made aware that there is no right or wrong answer, and no one 
will judge them if they do not know about a specific phishing attack. It put the students at 
ease and made the focus group discussion flow nicely. The first year Computing students 
from Canterbury Christ Church University helped each other with the questions about 
phishing attacks and learn from each other about the potential threat phishing poses to 
them and the general public.      
 
 
The second section of the results section of the study was questionnaires.  Questionnaire 
results found the different awareness levels of phishing variants. The questionnaire results 
focused on both ‘Research Question 1 and Research Question 2’.   Some policing and 
criminology students identified the risks phishing communication may pose to themselves, 
their friends and family. They were given the questionnaires at the beginning of the lecture 
and given 15 minutes to complete it. The number of anonymised questionnaires collected 
was 177 students. It was broken down to 100 (56%) the third-year policing students and 
77 (44%) criminology students who completed the questionnaire. It was due to the ease 
of sampling of students. The results could have looked at the broader Canterbury Christ 
Church student base from students in other facilities about phishing variants. For instance, 







The study has a limited sample size compared to UK government studies that do 
nationwide surveys within England and Wales about phishing attacks. This study focuses 
on a specific student population. It achieved this well. However, there were some 
limitations to this. The demographics of students in Canterbury Christ Church University 
has 15,000 students (Canterbury Christ Church University, 2020).  The current study can 
be generalised for other students in other university which can gauge their awareness of 




Figure 1: Result of first question in the questionnaire: Is the government doing enough to make 
users aware of phishing emails and their variants? 
 
Students asked about UK government websites making people aware of different types 
of fraudulent emails, text messages and calls from fraudsters. In (figure 1) 58% of students 
(103 students) said that UK government websites do not provide enough information and 
make people aware of different phishing variants. These results were from the School of 




students) were not sure about phishing variants or were not aware that there is information 
about phishing emails and their variants on different UK government websites. Only 11% 
(19 students) of university students agreed that there is information about phishing 
variants and precautions taken against social engineering tactics deployed by 
cybercriminals. The results found that people should be more aware of different phishing 
variants on UK government websites to find information about social engineering attacks.  
 
Data sampling: Focus Group and Anonymised Questionnaires 
 
 
The questionnaire data collection sample was with policing and criminology students. The 
focus group was with computing students. The knowledge and awareness levels of taking 
precautions with phishing attacks from cybercriminals from the two groups are mixed. 
Results may be suggesting that there were areas when the knowledge of students was 
weakest for some phishing variants. Some students struggled to explain the security 
measures and the identifying features of different types of phishing communication. The 
link between policing, criminology and computing students based on their mixed 
understanding of phishing communication from fraudsters is explained further in this 
chapter. The study wanted to compare policing and criminology students understanding 
of phishing communication from questionnaires with a focus group with computing 
students. A reason for this was to assess the computing students understanding of 
phishing communication in more detail by using a focus group instead of a questionnaire.   
 
 
The anonymised questionnaires sample size of 177 students which is a sufficiently large 
sample size. It is an effective sample size of policing and criminology students in 
Canterbury Christ Church University. But it is not a significant number when generalising 
the UK student population. However, the study wanted to carry out data collection from a 
specific population of students. Another limitation of the data collection sample from the 
anonymised questionnaires is it focused on a specific university department: School of 
Law, Criminal Justice and Policing at Canterbury Christ Church University. The study 
could have looked at different departments and how they respond to phishing 
communications and how students may have suggested security measures against 
phishing variants. The study wanted to look at a specific university department initially 






Figure 2: Result of second question in the questionnaire: ‘You have received an email 
from a purchase you have made online for an item you have ordered during the Christmas 
period. The email contains general item information such as: the order number and date 
purchased. The email advices you to click on the link on the email to check the delivery 
progress of your item. Would you click on the link?’  
 
There was an example of a spear-phishing email scenario (see figure 2) that included 
general item information such as the order number and date purchased. It was the second 
question in the anonymised questionnaire. NVivo was used to analyse the data. The 
‘Numbers’ application created the pie chart. The same data analysis methodology made 
all of the charts in the study.      
 
82% (145 students) will click on the link to check the progress of their item. It suggests 
that they may fall for this type of spear-phishing email. There is a detailed transcript of the 
students’ responses to the second question of the questionnaire (See Appendix E for 






Results (in figure 2) found that 145 students (82%) answered ‘yes’ shows in the Christmas 
phishing email scenario they may get defrauded. Of those surveyed, only 25 students 
(14%) answered ‘no’ do not click on the link within the email. There is a small portion of 
students who may not be a victim of the phishing attack. One student said no, and the link 
could contain malware that can steal their personal information or carry out malicious 
activity. It demonstrated that the student considered the cybersecurity risks associated 
with some emails might be phishing email can contain malware (Satpathy and Mohanty, 
2020). Another said no because the student usually signs up for text notification to alert 
them if their item has arrived. The student’s response may imply the student identifies the 
email as a phishing email and suggests getting order updates via text. A student said the 
email that they received would appear to be a phishing email. However, the student did 
say the reasons why the email is a phishing email. It does not show their awareness levels 
of the phishing email. Other awareness which was sought was the identifying features or 
content of a phishing communication. The rest of the students (4%) 7 students answered, 
I am not sure. 4% of students might not know anything about phishing emails.     
 
Interestingly, a student said that: 
 
 ‘I wouldn’t just randomly click on an email I would look at who it has been sent 
from to check its credibility-if I was unsure, I would just leave it’.   
 
It illustrates that the student may check if an email was genuine and then deciding to click 
or not to click on the link. However, the student did not explain if an email was a phishing 
email how the student would identify it as one and check its credibility.        
 
Students were asked if they received any phishing emails and then asked to explain how 
they identified the email to be a phishing email. The results of the third question created 
mixed responses. 98 students said yes, 32 said no and 47 students were not sure if they 
have or have not received a phishing email. From the 98 students a student said that:  
 
‘It is hard to identify them, banks etc will always write to you if it is important so any 
emails from banks, HMRC etc I always ignore’.  
 
This assumption of the student that banks or HMRC will always write to the recipient is 
not correct.  The student said that phishing emails sent to people are from banks and 
HMRC. This statement from the student is not correct. Different strategies to send 




to check the status of a library book they had borrowed. The student has not considered 
precautions taken if an email appears to be a phishing email.                
 
The question results asked if students received a phishing email. The results showed that 
some students do not know the difference between a spam email and a phishing email.     
 
Student  (7): ‘It just looked fake; I mean wow I’ve won an iPhone X from Aldi? yeah 
right’.    
 
Student (9): ‘Emails claiming that I have been in a road traffic accident, emails 
saying I have won in a competition and need to enter details to receive the prize’.  
 
These examples of generic spam emails sent to numerous recipients with notification they 
have won a prize or involved in a road traffic accident. Students may have misinterpreted 
the difference between a phishing email and a spam email. There appeared to be 
confusion or lack of awareness to identify the difference between phishing emails and 
spam emails. Some students thought that unsolicited spam emails sent to multiple emails 
and individuals with phishing emails.   
 
Students who said they were not sure on how to identify a phishing email response were:  
 
Student 1: ‘I tend to ignore dodgy emails, so they may not be phishing, but they 
also could be’  
Student 2: 'I wouldn’t know, hope not’  
Student 3: ‘Cannot identify’.  
 
 
From the questionnaire results three answers frequently appeared as an answer: ‘I do not 
know’. They ‘cannot identity a phishing email’ and ‘assumption that a phishing email will 
always be sent to the junk section of their email’ These students are more likely to be 
victims of social engineering attacks because they do not have enough awareness and 
knowledge about different types of phishing variants.  
 
Another concerning factor when the students responded as: ‘I do not know’. 
 
If they check emails which appear to be important and open emails if they are 
expecting a reply from someone. This can result in them either opening or 
downloading unknown attachments or opening links within an email because they 




A scenario-based question was assessing whether the students will be a victim of a 
smishing text message or not. Some students said they will click on the link to read through 
it or find out what it is about.  
 
Another student said:  
 
Student 15: ‘Open the link to check that it is legitimate. Check that there is the lock 
on the left-hand side to make sure it is secure’.  
 
 
The student did not consider once clicking on the link they may have their personal 
information stolen and might become a victim of identity theft or have a spyware, malware 
and a trojan virus installed on their mobile phone to either steal their personal information 
or use their mobile phone to connect to a zombie bot network to launch cyber-attacks such 
as Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) attacks without their knowledge 
(Terranova, 2021).  
 
 
A student might have based the legitimacy of a  link in a text message if it appeared 
encrypted by showing a lock icon in the URL. It shows the student will click on the link can 
result in having their personal information stolen. Also, the student may be lacking a basic 
level of online safety awareness (Furnell, 2007), and they react to trust indicators which 
in this case was a ‘lock icon’ (Jakobsson et al., 2007). Moreover, hackers may generate 
a fraudulent link that appears to be encrypted to steal their debit-card or credit card 
information in a smishing text message.   
 
Some students said they click on the link to pay the delivery fees:  
‘Pay the delivery fee’.  
‘Pay it to prevent any hassle of getting my parcel. I would rather pay to receive it at a 
specific time then wait to get it’.  
‘Click on link check if link is same as actual FedEx website if it is then pay fee’.  
 
The students can have their personal information stolen when they will click on the link. 
These students said they wanted to check if the delivery website looks official. Some 
students may enter their card details to pay for the delivery fee. These students could be 





(Figure 3) Result of fifth question in the questionnaire: What would you do if you receive 
an email with an attachment? 
 
The fifth question in the questionnaire result was mixed. The majority of 127 students  
(83%)  said they check the source of an email attachment. The majority of the answers 
stated they would open attachments if they recognised the sender. The results indicated 
that they are more likely to check attachments are malicious or not. The answers given 
about the email attachments were vague and did not specify how the students may check 
attachments are malicious. Most of the responses were:   
 
Student 1: ‘Depending who it is from, I would open it’. 
 
Student 2: ‘I would check the email, depending on who it is from I would view the 
attachment.’ 
 
Some students may be defrauded from spear-phishing emails when cybercriminals use 
tactics to persuade them to download a malicious file attachment. Spear-phishing attacks 
are targeted attacks and use information about a target to make the attacks more specific 
and personal to the target (Phishing Tackle, 2021). It could make some of the students 
vulnerable to spear-phishing emails when most students said they open attachments from 
someone they trust (See detailed transcript of student responses for question 5 in 




7% (25 students) said they open the attachment in an email. Some examples of the 
responses were:   
 
‘Open the attachment’. 
Open the attachment, only if PDF’.  
 
Some students may not identify or explicitly said they would check if the email with the 
attachment is a phishing email. Some even said they trust a PDF file format as an email 
attachment regardless of who sent the email. It is worrying because a phishing email 
attachment may contain malicious malware variants such as viruses, worms, trojan 
horses, spyware and adware when opened or downloaded onto their electronic devices. 
The malicious network content may enter the students’ electronic devices when they open 
a phishing email.     
 
Examples from students who will open an attachment: 
Student 1: ‘If it's a PDF document’.   
Student 2: ‘Generally, open it as it most likely may mean something-they can’t hack me 
from opening an attachment.'  
 
 
These statements from the students are untrue. Students may not have known that 
cybercriminals can hack their electronic device if malicious attachments are open. 
Students could consider a PDF email attachment is harmless once opened from an 
unverified sender in a phishing email.  The students may not know that PDF attachments 
contain embedded malicious executable programs. Students may not be aware that some 
PDFs can have a virus or hidden malware (Abraham, 2021). Also, the attachments may 
contain malicious content that may be in PDF files can infect different files through a 
variety of malware attack vectors: JavaScript, a system command, hidden objects and 
multimedia control (Amin et al., 2013). JavaScript in websites coding is to control browser 
appearance and functionality. Vulnerabilities are exploited in Adobe to carry out malicious 
activities. A PDF attachment can open a command window and execute commands to 
initiate malware in system commands. Hidden and embedded objects in PDF attachments 
are encrypted. Embedded and hidden objects can make detection difficult for anti-virus 
scanners. Hidden objects execute malicious commands when a PDF attachment is open 
in phishing email variants. Multimedia control is when some malicious PDF attachments 
have embedded and hidden objects that could be a QuickTime media or flash file. 





Some anti-virus software may have limited effectiveness when scanning files or phishing 
email attachments for malicious content against different exploits from polymorphic 
malware attacks. Polymorphic malware can defeat the signature match by mutating itself 
while keeping its original malicious capabilities intact (Rad et al., 2011). Malware 
signatures from attachments generate one form of a polymorphic virus that may not match 
against a mutated form (Rad et al., 2012). Thus, polymorphic malware is known as 
multiple viruses rather than a single virus. Anti-virus software which identifies polymorphic 
malware variants is desirable. Most anti-virus software cannot detect these (Fraley, 2017). 
Naidu (2018) found that modern anti-virus systems cannot detect new polymorphic 
malware variants even if the signatures match with one or more variants belonging to a 
specific polymorphic malware.          
 
 
One of the issues with detecting malware variants within attachments is malware 
detections systems may not detect malware without a password. Malware detection 
systems can find it challenging when scanning encrypted content from hackers.   The 
result of the questionnaires indicated that students are enticed to open and decrypt the 
attachment, thereby executing malicious executable or other malware variants within a 
student’s device/devices. It is because malware writers who attach encrypted attachments 
in phishing emails can make detection from anti-malware systems difficult.  Malware 
writers rely on a social relationship between the ‘sender’ of the email and the recipient to 
make it appear safe to open an attachment. The attachment content uses deceptive 
tactics to trick the recipient into believing it is safe to open an attachment without 
consequences. It was the case when some of the students in the anonymised 
questionnaire said they open an attachment in an email (Amin et al., 2013).   
 
 
Student (7) said that if they receive an email from someone, they do not know they would 
not open an email attachment but if an email attachment appears to have been sent from 
a family/friend or an official company they will open the attachment:  
 
 
Student (7): ‘If it’s from someone I don’t know, I wouldn’t open it as I don’t trust 






Student (7) may not be aware that cybercriminals can send phishing emails that appear 
to be from an official company or sent from family or a friend. The student could be a victim 
of a phishing email in the future because the student did not stipulate in their response to 
the question that they do thorough checks even if the email is supposedly from their family 
and friends or an official company. Recipients who open attachments from an email 
without checking the content of the email and verifying its legitimacy may lack the security 
awareness required to protect them against phishing attacks.  
 
In contrast, 25 students (8%)  stated they will not open the email:  
 
Student (1): ‘Don’t click on the attachment until you know it’s legit.’   
 
Student (2): ‘Do not click on the attachment.’  
 
 
These responses to the question illustrate that 8% of students might check the source of 
the email. It shows the students are slightly more cautious when they got an attachment 
from a person in an email. Students said they either ignore an email or open it. But they 
did not specify the underlying decision-making process about why not to open the email 
attachment.      
 
Student (11): 
 ‘Depends where it's from. If I didn’t expect to get it I’d ignore/delete’. 
 
Most people do this when they get a phishing email. They delete phishing emails or are 
relying on the spam filter embedded in their emails to filter malicious emails (Yu, 2020).     
 
Student (10):  
‘Depends where it’s from’.  
 
The student (10) may be vulnerable to the personalisation of spear phishing attacks that 
can lure a student divulge personal information because it is seen as less suspicious 
compared to spam phishing baits due to their target approach. The nature of sophisticated 
spear-phishing emails can make them difficult to detect. A spear-phishing email careful 
design and timing of a message should make it possible for a user to click on a link. A 




For example, the phishing message might come from a known sender (Benenson et al., 
2017). 
 
The results presented in the bar graph (below) shows the most common responses 
provided by criminology and policing students.  Students’ precautions taken avoid 
phishing emails and their variants: SMS Phishing/Smishing, Vishing, Spear Phishing and 
Pharming.  
 
(Figure 3) Results from question 6: What precautions should you take to avoid phishing 
emails and their variants: ‘SMiShing’ (SMS phishing), Vishing, Spear Phishing and 
Pharming? 
 
The majority of students did not suggest anti-virus and anti-phishing browser security 
toolbars to detect a phishing website domain when visited by a user. Only 1% of students 
(2 students) in the questionnaire stated that they use security software against phishing 




communication that may contain malware.  11% (19 students) of the students said they 
don’t open links from phishing variants. It is worrying as the remainder of the students may 
be defrauded from phishing emails and their variants if they open links. Another worrying 
aspect of the results is that 4% of students (7 students)  said they check phishing variants 
which means that 96% of students (170 students) may not check phishing variants when 
they receive one. (See Appendix G, Question 6 Students Response Data pp.182-190).   
 
3% of students (5 students) responded ‘do not know’ what to do if they received a phishing 
communication.  
 
Some students who did not know what the phishing terms meant said:  
 
Student 111: ‘I don’t really know what phishing means’ ‘Never heard of any of them’. 
 
Student 99: ‘I don’t know…Never been taught or told’.  
 
Student 66: ‘Not sure’.  
 
Student 70: ‘I don’t know’ 
 
Student 15:  ‘Unsure, maybe avoid entering your email address into websites 
unless needed’.  
 
 
The result of the question found students who were not aware of phishing emails and their 
variants and the precautions they should take is worrying. They are more likely to be 
defrauded by cybercriminals from phishing variants. Results of the question found some 
students may not be aware of phishing variants. They do not know how to identify phishing 
variants and precautions they should take to avoid phishing variants. There could be a 
possibility that students are not familiar with the terminology used to describe the different 
type of phishing variants and thus are unable to explain security measures to be taken to 
avoid them. The students who were unsure about what phishing attacks mean may not 
educate themselves or educated from phishing training sessions about the latest cyber 










A student suggested security measure such as: 
 
 ‘Have a better security software like a VPN’. 
 
It does not necessarily prevent phishing variants because they can bypass security 
measures such as a VPN or if the victim clicks on a link on an SMS phishing that can 
potentially install spyware or malware on their mobile phone.  
Other precautions that students suggested in the questionnaire was: 
 
Student 13: ‘Create a spam folder for emails’  
 
Student 33: ‘Have different passwords for different accounts. Put them in spam so 
they only appear in junk’ and ‘Spam filter, change email received settings’ 
 
 
These precautions can reduce the number of spam emails received in their email inbox 
but not phishing emails. The students failed to understand that even if they install a spam 
filter or have different passwords for different accounts' it does not act as a precaution 
against different phishing variants. Additionally, spam filters may find difficulties detecting 
image spam because it executes a range of image creation and randomisation algorithms. 
In image spam, the text message is embedded into attached images to bypass anti-spam 
filters. In Image spam an obfuscating method in which the text of an image is stored as a 
GIF or JPEG image and displayed in a phishing email. This prevents text-based spam 
filters to block the malicious email (Ismail et al., 2019). 
 
Moreover, a student said that having different passwords for different accounts can protect 
the user’s accounts. But this not the case for malicious phishing emails and their variants. 
A student’s security measure for having different passwords is ineffective against some 
phishing variants. Some phishing communication may deploy spyware onto a victim’s 
electronic device once an email attachment downloaded or a link clicked on in an email 
can steal their passwords of the individual users on their accounts. Other phishing variants 
create a login web page that is a replica of a target organisation include images and the 
logo sent to a user in an email message, requesting them to log in to keep their accounts 
active. Thus, this may compromise a participant’s different passwords on their accounts. 
Some cybercriminals send an email with a link to the login page hosted in a fraudulent 
server. The fraudulent login page hosted at a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) matches 
the original, genuine login page. There is a slight difference in the domain name that rarely 




Student (7) said to create a spam folder for emails but did not state the features of different 
phishing attacks. The student did not mention how to identify phishing variants. Creating 
a spam folder does not act as a security measure to protect the respondent against 
phishing attacks.    
 
 
Other students suggested to: 
 
Student (3): ‘Avoid dodgy websites block the number/email as soon as receiving 
redirect unknown emails to junk’.  
 
Student (114): ’Don’t go on random sites and input personal data’.  
 
Student (93): ’Block emails and text if this carries on then keep blocking and 
ignoring’.  
 
Student (172): ’Not giving out email/ number to unknown sources’.  
 
Student (32): ’Don’t give out your email, phone number to random people and 
select no when they ask to pass your details onto other people’. 
 
 
Providing personal information on questionable websites and providing sensitive 
information to other people can lead to phishing variants to be received which is identified 
from the students. The answers did not expand on why personal information should not 
be entered on ‘random sites’ which does not show if they know about the precautions 
need to undertake against different types of phishing communication distributed by 
fraudsters. Some of these suggestions are not precautions for different phishing variants 
such as avoiding phishing websites does not prevent phishing variants as well as blocking 
emails and text continuously does not act as a precaution to phishing variants because 
the participants did not state the precautions which needs to be undertaken to avoid 











The limitation of browsers which blacklists phishing URLs is that the phishing URL has to 
be previously included in the blacklist. Thus, the participant will still need to be cautious 
when they visit certain websites which can be phishing websites. Participants may have 
not been aware of the security precautions which can be taken against some types of 
phishing emails. There are some machine learning systems which can be used by users 
to detect phishing such as: streaming analytics, neural networks and support vector 
machines. However, a drawback of these machine learning systems which detect phishing 
by deleting or adding the features extracted from the email is it can be time-consuming 
because the features are manually selected which is one of the limitations of machine 
learning techniques, and Deep Learning which is a subfield of machine learning requires 
a vast amount of data for better results but does not need manual feature engineering and 
can detect new phishing URLs. Also, the increased sophistication of malware variants 
used in phishing variants can bypass security mechanisms (Nmachi and Win, 2021). For 
example, the limitations of blacklists that use a heuristic-based approach detect newly 
phishing websites which blacklist is not able to do (Abdelhamid et al. 2014), and the ability 
of heuristic-based improved the rule-based method of detecting phishing attacks. The 
rule-based approaches perform well on set rules, but they do generate high false alarm 
rates. The rule-based approaches in machine learning need a user to update set rules for 
a vast amount of data which is a challenge to this approach (Xiujuan et al., 2019).    
 
 
Malware authors who launch phishing attacks use communication channels hidden within 
network traffic. They are benign and difficult to block. The domain names that host the 
command and control (C and C) server change domain names. Domain Generation 
Algorithm (DGA) generates millions of pseudo-random domain names. The compromised 
devices will attempt to connect to be provided with new commands, making blacklisting 
methods useless. The botmaster use of fast-flux to change IP addresses can make 
takedown mechanisms used against malicious phishing domains challenging (Yue and 







Figure 4: Malicious phishing email with the purpose is for the theft of personal information 
from victims who may have a PayPal Account  
 
 
(Figure 4) shows an example of a malicious phishing email with the purpose of theft of 
personal information from victims who may have a PayPal account. The blue arrows show 
the identifying features of some phishing emails. This email identified as a phishing email 
from the fraudulent ‘from address’. The email has a generic opening of the email ‘Dear 
Customer’  email asks the recipient to verify my PayPal account information by clicking on 
a link. Additionally, the email subject has a sense of urgency about the PayPal account: 
‘Take Action on your PayPal Account’. The content of the email states an issue with the 
PayPal account. There have been unauthorised login attempts from another location, and 
there is information missing or incorrect in the PayPal account. These are all features of 
a phishing email that may not get identified by some users who do not know how to 






The majority of the students said that they will contact PayPal by calling them directly: 
 
Student 1: ‘Contact PayPal myself to check the accuracy of the email’. 
 
Student 2: ‘Contact PayPal before doing anything in the email’.  
 
Student 3: ‘Contact PayPal or cancel/freeze the card attached to the PayPal 
account’.  
 
Student 4: ‘Call PayPal helpline to sort the problem directly’. 
 
Student 5: ‘Ring them and ask for a full explanation’. 
 
Student 6: ‘I would call up PayPal customer services to figure out what is going on’. 
 
Student 7: ‘Ring them and ask for a full explanation’.  
 
Student 8: ‘I would ring PayPal to make sure it is from them’.  
 
The students did do the right thing to call PayPal directly to ask about the legitimacy of the 
email they have received. However, there is one issue with this method. Students are 
relying on the caller’s knowledge of phishing emails in the PayPal customer service call 
centre to decide whether they reply to the email or not. The caller could believe in the 
legitimacy of the PayPal phishing email when described the email or if the individual sends 
the PayPal phishing email to the customer service advisor in PayPal. Also it is highly 
unlikely that the PayPal customer service representative will not know if the email is 
legitimate or not.    
 
Student (37) suggested steps they would have taken if they received the email from 
PayPal: 
 ‘Ignore the email and check online banking or ring up the bank and delete email’.  
 
Student (81) explained what they would do if they received from PayPal: 
 
 ‘Click the address of the sender and then maybe log into PayPal from a browser 
to check’.  
 
Student (81) would check the origin of the email address from the sender to see if it is a 
phishing email and then will call the bank to check for any fraudulent activity on their 
PayPal account. It illustrates that the students are following the correct procedure when 
they receive a phishing email from PayPal. They will check for fraudulent activity on their 




PayPal account in a search engine. Students said they do this to check the legitimacy of 
the email they have received.         
 
Only a small proportion of students mentioned being aware of unknown links:  
 
Student (143): ‘Keep an eye on who’s sending them and not opening unknown 
links’  
 
Student (122): ‘Be extra vigilant and use common sense. Block any emails 
addresses that you have previously received phishing from’ 
 
Student (170): ‘Don’t click links etc that don’t seem real.’   
 
 
These students said they do not click on links, but they did not explain why they should 
not do that. They did not explain and identified further precautions needed against some 
types of phishing communication. It can make them prone to sophisticated phishing 
attacks in the future and failure to identify fraudulent aspects of phishing emails. 
 
There were some responses about identifying some types of phishing variants which may 
contain grammatical and spelling mistakes. The participants mentioned about protection 
needed for devices as well as avoiding providing personal information: 
 
Student (91): ‘Looking for unusual names and email contacts and number. Any 
spelling mistakes on text. Have some protection on your devices. Don’t give out 
personal information’.  
 
 
However, some users could be vulnerable to malware-based phishing if they download 
malware is malicious software installed on the victim's machine without their knowledge. 
Students mentioned having protection on their devices, but cybercriminals can trick a 
victim download malicious anti-virus software which contains malware or a virus.  The 
fraudulent anti-virus software designed to destroy content on the system. Or the fake anti-
virus software can steal private information from the user. The malware within the 
fraudulent anti-virus software is challenging to detect and remove because it can access 








(Figure 5) Result of question 8 of questionnaire: Do you use security safeguards (firewalls 
and/or VPN-Virtual Private Network) on your electronic devices that you may use on a 
daily basis in order to prevent you from receiving different types of phishing 
communication via email, phone or from text messages? 
 
The result of question 8 in (figure 5) emphasises that phishing variants will continue to 
be a cyber-security threat. The results revealed that only (71 students) 40% of students 
use security safeguards (firewalls/VPN) on their electronic devices. Some of the reasons 
provided by those who use security software on their electronic devices was:  
Student 147: ‘To safeguard against criminal entities.’  
Student 153: ‘I always use firewalls on my laptop to avoid being hacked and 
because most importantly I want my information to stay safe and protected.’  
Student 69: ‘I use a VPN on my phone and tablets and there is a firewall on my 
laptop.’  
Student 71:’Because I don’t want my computer to be hacked’.  




These responses illustrate that most students want their personal information to be 
encrypted and protected from malicious hacking attacks. Security software may prevent a 
small proportion of phishing-attacks. Security software does not defend against some 
types of phishing variants such as spear-phishing emails, SMS phishing, phishing emails 
links that may contain ransomware malware protected by most firewalls. VPNs are 
vulnerable to phishing attacks (Raphaely, 2020).  The study wanted to identify students 
who use VPN to protect themselves from cyber-attacks and having security in their 
electronic devices (Sokolov et al., 2021).     
 
43% (76 students) out of 177 students in the anonymised questionnaires do not use any 
security tools to protect their laptops, computers, mobile phones and tablets. It can pose 
a higher risk for them exposed to different social engineering attacks and advanced 
persistent threat spear-phishing attacks against their electronic devices designed to steal 
personal information to commit fraud. The questionnaire results found why the students 
did not have security software installed on their devices is they do not know how to install 
the software or do not know enough about a particular software needed to protect their 
devices.   
They all given similar answers such as:  
 
Student 79: ‘I wouldn’t know how to set it up’.  
 
Student 18: ‘Don’t know how to get them’.  
 
Student 113: ‘I don’t know how to use it’.  
 
Student 62: ‘Don’t need to or know how’.  
 
Student 13: ‘Don’t know what it is/does.’  
 
Student 119: ‘Do not know enough about them’.  
 
The answers may have indicated a lack of understanding of what a security software does 
and familiarity with defence against some phishing attacks. They do not know how to 
install security software on their electronic devices. It demonstrates the lack of knowledge 
and awareness of different security software from users needed for protection against 
social engineering attacks (Abawajy and Kim 2010). The majority of online security threats 
based on the lack of user awareness of security software available for users to protect 




Students in the questionnaire who do not have security tools on their electronic devices 
may have weak knowledge and awareness about phishing threats. Some students may 
not know how to install software like anti-phishing filters and firewalls and knowledge 
about security precautions. A reason for the lack of understanding and awareness against 
phishing, spyware, trojans and worms may be the failure of students to keep themselves 
up to date with the latest security threats and security countermeasures that need to be 
installed on electronic devices to protect themselves against various cyber-attacks 
(Williams et al. 2020). It suggests that the participants may be vulnerable to new phishing 
attacks they may not be aware of in the future. 
 
Factors that may contribute to some students not updating themselves about security tools 
to protect themselves against various social engineering attacks based on security 
awareness campaigns are mostly PowerPoint slides or digital posters on the university 
website and their workplace. These strategies are often ineffective and do not capture the 
attention of the students. Participants need to be aware of anything that requires them to 
open an attachment or click on a link. The perceived credibility of a message has an 
impact on persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). It may have been an influential factor 
when students receive phishing variants. Evidence suggests that the appearance and the 
background credentials of phishing emails have a persuasive impact. The credibility of 
phishing communication includes message formation and layout. The visual appearance 
of a phishing email is well-written, well-organised and well-produced. It can increase the 
credibility and persuasion of a phishing email (Rao and Upadhyaya, 2009).  
 
Raising awareness about phishing variants is not simple. It can be challenging to make 
people aware of phishing communication. People may not be thinking about phishing 
training when they get a phishing email (Williams et al., 2019). On the other hand, there 
are preventive measures that can protect users from malicious phishing websites. If a link 
cannot direct the user to open a malicious website, then the phishing attack cannot 
continue. A majority of up-to-date browsers may block phishing domains, websites and 
malware sites on desktop computers, laptops or tablets but do not always block malicious 
phishing communication on mobile devices. Phishing detection methods can include 
content-based approaches that examine phishing page content with URL features (Zhang 






The results of a focus group and the anonymised questionnaires suggested that part of 
the issue with not having security software’s for electronic devices is due to a lack of 
awareness of the severity of phishing attacks. A lack of education on the benefits of using 
different security software protects from some phishing attacks.   
 
 
Some policing and criminology students stated that they did not install security software 
on their electronic devices due to lack of affordability and refusing to purchase security 
software. Some responses provided were: 
 
Student 113: ‘I think you have to pay for these services. So, I don’t because I am 
too poor and confusion.’  
 
 
Student 103: ‘Don’t want to pay for them.’  
 
 
Student 1: ‘Can’t afford it’.  
 
Some students may not have security software on their electronic devices because they 
may not be aware of free security software. Free security software can protect their 
personal information. Orhan and Karyda (2017) found that data breaches from phishing 
attacks stims from poor security practices and the human factor of being vulnerable to 
specific phishing variants.    
 
The phishing email from the bank scenario was about fraudulent activity on their bank 
card. As a result, their bank deactivated their bank card temporarily. The majority of 
students said they call their bank or visit their local bank branch. The results showed that 
a majority of students might not fall for this type of phishing attack.   
 
Some of the responses to the question were: 
 
Student (88): ‘I would go into a branch and check my account there or call the 
customer service phone number of the bank’.  
 
Student 89: ‘Ring the bank or go in store straight away, and not reply to the email. 
Also, double check my card has been blocked/frozen’.  
 
Student 90: ‘Ring the bank or go into branch.’  
 




These students may have identified the email as a phishing email because their bank calls 
them, or they will call the bank or go into their branch if there has been fraudulent activity 
on their bank card. The result of the question indicated that the majority of the students 
might not be defrauded from a bank phishing email scenario in the anonymised 
questionnaire. 
 
The result from question nine of the phishing email bank scenario indicated that the 
participants might have been aware of phishing emails from banks. Different factors can 
contribute to university student’s awareness of bank phishing email who participated in 
the questionnaire. They may have previous security awareness training in their workplace 
or education setting about phishing emails from a bank. Some students may have general 
cybersecurity awareness about social engineering threats. Students could be aware of 
bank phishing emails by getting an email from their bank about phishing emails. 
Employees in the bank trained about phishing emails could have told the students about 
bank phishing emails by sending them emails or talking to them in the bank branch about 
different phishing communication.   
 
Vishing Fraud discussion in focus group  
 
There was a discussion about vishing using open-ended questioning to gauge as much 
information from the students understanding and awareness about vishing.   
 
Student  (5) said that:  
 
Student 5: ’Often when you receive a phone call, they make out that like they know 
something. And if you are trying to identify details or get clarification, they will just 
continue to repeat the same question. You'll find that they know perhaps they don't 
know absolutely bugger all about you, besides your name, and going to try and get 
information from you and say, this happened, and they won't be able to tell you 
when or anything so what you should do when you answer these calls is not give, 
not being forthcoming with information and make sure they actually know things 
about you. Because otherwise all they've done is pull basic details of you from 
anywhere which is obviously public, and they are using that to try and deceive you’.  
 
 
Student (5) identified the purpose of a vishing attack from a fraudster who is attempting to 






Student (4) mentioned one type of vishing variant which was a pre-recorded message:  
 
‘Some of them are pre-recorded aren't they and when you answer they carry on 
the conversation. And it is just a pre-recorded person.’  
 
A student identified a vishing phone call but did not explain why they should not carry on 
the conversation. The student was prompted and asked for clarification but did not say 
why they should not carry on the conversation.     
 
Student (2):  
 
‘If you reply...hello, they actually record the hello, and they can use it to get into 
your bank account… Like, they do require you to say hello into the phones activate 
the banking voice ID, which is what they're trying to phish for’, This participant has 
identified a vishing variant which is attempting to phish for a particular word to 
access a victim’s bank account. However, the participant did not know that 
answering an unknown number can alert vishing fraudsters that the number is 
active, which can lead to more calls in the future.  
 
 
Student (3):  
 
‘This is like, if it's an unknown, or an unknown caller just don't answer it’ which may 
result in less phone calls from fraudsters and a lower chance of being defrauded.  
 
Student (1):  
‘My android phone doesn't come up with an unknown caller, if I am applying for 
jobs, and it comes with an ID that I don't know 9 times out of 10 I'm gonna answer 
it in case I want a job I don't know what the phone call is I am going to answer it’.  
 
 
Student (1) could be defrauded because the student could provide their personal 
information if they receive a vishing phone call. But the student does have a point that if 
the student is waiting from a job offer the student will be likely answer the call from their 
phone. There is no solution to this issue to date because it is sometimes difficult for people 
to tell when they are being vished (Kaspersky, 2021).  
 
The focus group students were asked about spear-phishing emails and the majority of 







Phishing communication from fraudsters   
 
The focus group data found that by focusing on a particular subject. It identified some 
phishing variants that are difficult to avoid due to their sophistication (Wilkinson, 2004). A 
reason for focusing on some phishing communication is it may help the students to focus 
on one type of phishing.  It can help them to discuss a phishing variant instead of different 
types of phishing in their response. It enabled me to gain a detailed understanding of one 
specific phishing attack used by a fraudster. Also, it showed when asked about potential 
security measures taken against phishing variants.    
 
Student (5) stated that all emails should be checked by IT technicians before being sent 
to a user: 
 
 ‘All the emails are checked by the IT technicians before actually being received by 
the user. So, they'll check it to begin with see if this is an actual work email and 
then send to the actual person...whereas my personal point, is there's no filter it 
just goes straight to your inbox’.  
 
 
It is problematic when several emails received by IT technicians throughout a day to check 
if it is a phishing email or not. It is not a possible solution to prevent different phishing 
communication because there are numerous emails sent to Canterbury Christ Church 
University every day. There is anti-filtering or anti-phishing software used to read all of 
these emails to check if they are malicious or not based on the rules that it uses. Also, 
some IT technicians may not identify some sophisticated phishing email due to which can 
still result in a phishing email sent to a user.  
 
Student (1) stated that IT technicians are unable to notice some types of phishing 
variants: 'Sometimes you really can't tell though, because people SMS spoof and 
they do email header spoofing, they like to spoof the headers and said look, if you're 
an IT technician you see an email come through from your colleague, they'll just 
forward it through like it won't get caught by the filters automatically but if you do 
check the headers normally you can see it's been manipulated’  
 
 
The student has given an example of a phishing email using ‘email header spoofing’ is 







Moreover, student (3) said that security measures against phishing variants is user 
awareness and specific protocols to deal with different phishing communication:  
 
‘Having specific protocols in place. Companies can deal with unknown callers, or 
out of hours callers or emails that don't look quite right. But it is also the user being 
aware of something that sounds too good to be true, it is, and if you don't know 
where it is from don't open it and if you are not expecting it don't open it. That sort 
of stuff’.  
 
 
The student did not state that how a user could identify a phishing email. The student 
response was vague in some places: ‘specific protocols in place to deal with unknown 
callers.’ The student did not explain how it could be a potential social engineering risk to 
companies or how specific protocols can prevent some types of phishing attacks. It was 
followed up in the focus group by asking the students further questions.   A student in the 
focus group stated that the preventive security measure against phishing variants was not 
to open it and but the respondent did not mention specific security measures or 
precautions to take against from some types of phishing attacks.  
 




‘Isn't it just like spear-phishing is where they like targeting you as an individual, so 
I better be very like so say you work for an organisation. It's like, actually. So, 
instead of just sending it out to like many people would be like spear-phishing an 
exact company. And like trying to like to target the company on its own like create 
a, almost like a plan around it’. 
 
 
The student did mention how a spear-phishing attack targets a specific organisation. But 
the student did not explain how spear-phishing works and how spear-phishing can defraud 
an organisation. It was evident that there was a lack of awareness about spear-phishing 
emails in the focus group. Computing students did not provide information about spear-
phishing emails when asked further questions for clarification.   
 
 
Students were asked about what smishing text message attacks are and if any of them 
received one in the past. The purpose of asking this question to the focus group is to 
gauge the research volunteers understanding, awareness and knowledge on smishing 




Student (1) who was familiar with a smishing text message:  
 
‘There was one from student finance text message. It said there was a problem 
with their student finance, and they needed to update their bank details. And there 
was a link that you clicked on and soon as you clicked on it... sent you to the 
website’  
 
Student (1) provided an example of a smishing text message from Student Finance 
England; but did not develop their answer by explaining why a user should not click on a 
link within a smishing text message. The student was encouraged to develop their answer 
by asking further questions in the focus group, but the student did not elaborate on the 
cyber-risks of clicking on the link in a smishing text message.   
 
Students were asked further questions about how they would identify a smishing text 
message from fraudsters and a student provided an example: 
 
 ‘It will be like urgent your bank account will be deactivated in 24 hours. Click on 
this link kind of thing’ the participant given an example of a smishing text message 
from a bank, but the participant did not explain the fraudulent aspects of a smishing 
text message and how a user can avoid being a victim of a smishing text message.’ 
 
 
This is related to studies in past that a message can overwhelm people and can result in 
fear which includes response time pressures with words described by a student: 
’deactivated in 24 hours’. People may react increase their information processing under 
time pressure, and they are less likely to have confidence in their decision (Verplanken, 
1993). In addition, a smishing text message may not state ‘Click on this link…’ but 
cybercriminals may make a smishing text message content persuasive by using a 
combination of appeals and structure. This is similar to a phishing emails whereby 
persuasive elements encourage recipients to accept them as genuine (Kim and Kim 
2013). 
 
Student (3) stated that: ‘So wouldn't you just go to the site. Why would you click a 
link in a text? If my bank went to me your bank is shutting five hours you gotta sort 
it out. I am not going to text you... I'll go to the bank's website’  
 
This demonstrates the student’s may be aware of a smishing text message the person will 







Student (2) supported what the other student said: ‘If someone says in a bank 
email, I need your login by clicking on this link, then that's dodgy.’    
 
Student (2) could be aware that the link in the smishing text message was from a 
fraudulent source but did not explain the identifying features of a smishing text message. 
The students in the focus group were aware of two types of smishing text messages from 
a bank and Student Finance England. However, there were not any specific responses in 
relation to the cyber-security risks of clicking on a link in smishing text messages. 
Additionally, the students did not discuss about the techniques used to detect smishing 
such as content-based filtering which involves examining the text in the SMS. Content-
based filtering is based on the contents in a text message, smishing message is 
categorised. Students in the focus group did not discuss the features of a smishing text 
message and the different anti-smishing software they could use to reduce the probability 
of receiving a smishing text message. 
 
Diksha and Ankit, (2017) suggested a smishing classifier to be used against smishing 
messages. A smishing classifier used a blacklist method, URL inspection method and 
content-based approaches to identify smishing messages. They used the URL inspection 
method to analyse the malicious processes of the URL and used the blacklist method to 
check if the URL is included in the blacklist. The students in the focus group were not 
aware of anti-smishing software which can increase the chance of them being defrauded 
by smishing text messages because they are not using anti-smishing software. In contrast 
the issue with content-based filtering is it can be expensive and can cause the privacy of 
the user to be invaded (Xu and Xiang et al., 2012). 
 
Students were asked a question in relation to a fictional scenario which was in fact a 
smishing text message. The scenario was about if they were expecting a delivery during 
the Christmas period and they had received a text message which had their delivery 
details such as their order number and so on would they click on a link in the text message. 










Student (4) who was aware of one type of smishing text message variant said: 
 
 ‘It could have been a database breach, and someone could have gone through and like 
coordinate like a spear phishing attack and actually like what made it so they wrote a script 
which just fills in the gaps… which is reasons why you just don't click links on emails or 
text’ 
 
The student classified a smishing text message could be sent to a person to look like a 
spear-phishing attack. But the student did not describe specific features of a smishing text 
message sent by a fraudster or why a person should not click on links on a smishing text 
message if it appears to be fraudulent. 
 
In comparison another student (2) said that: 
 
 ‘Wouldn't most courier places come up with a text message saying it is from Amazon or 
DPD on your phone... if they somehow did that you will believe it is them so…'  
 
 
The student could fall for a smishing text message. The student assumed that if the text 
message appeared to be from Amazon or DPD could be legitimate. The student may 
think that the text message is trustworthy if a cybercriminal crafted a sophisticated 
smishing text message originating from a courier company such as Amazon or DPD.        
 
 
Scenario-based discussion asked about PDF document attachment from a 
University Lecturer  
 
Computing students were asked in a focus group  to answer a question from a fictional 
scenario about a phishing email that includes legitimate details so that they will download 
a PDF file sent by their lecturer or someone they know. Computing students all said that 
they download a PDF file from the scenario-based phishing email.  
 
Student (4) in response to the question that a file was downloaded it will be scanned from 
their computer and will give a warning about the PDF file in an email. This is true for most 
anti-virus software that scan email downloads before they are opened. Also, webmail will 
scan the email at the server. However, it is possible for new malware variants that are 
unknown by the anti-virus software to get through. Viruses and malware change rapidly 




(Keepnet Labs, 2020). For example, trojan viruses and network worms actively search for 
antivirus programs from a victim computer and the malware will attempt to block the 
antivirus software, damage the antivirus databases and prevent the antivirus software’s 
update processes (Kaspersky 2021) :  
 
‘But most security software now scan anything from an email... like my one anything 
I download like a PDF it will give you a warning so. My computer isn't a problem 
like my phone might be’. 
 
The student may not know that if you download a PDF document to their computer or 
mobile phone. It will download a malicious file to gain access to their computer or mobile 
phone. The attached file could be a malicious PDF attachment. Once opened by the 
respondent, will execute a script to infiltrate the person’s system. Cybercriminals may 
choose to take remote control over their system Remote Access Trojan (RAT). Steal their 
credentials (keyloggers), download spyware to monitor the network, gather as well as 
extract files or encrypt the person’s files on their computer and demand a ransom payment 
(ransomware), or increase their privileges on the victim’s computer (Europol, 2019).    
 
A student added that malware signature used in malicious PDF files in phishing emails 
can evade some email filters once downloaded:  
 
‘Depends on the signature of the malware a lot of PDFs if you open a PDF, it could 
be like, but especially with Adobe. It might not scan the malware signature, but it 
might have some sort of like evasion software on it’.  
 
It could depend on the malware variants such as Adware, Crimeware, Rootkits and 
Spyware.  Malware can develop rapidly and become complicated and evolve into more 
sophisticated attacks. Phishing emails with malware can carry out executable code to the 
host and replicate it. Some malware in phishing emails embeds compromised documents 
and hide a malicious file type like a PDF file (Islam and Ozkaya 2019).    
 
The findings of the focus group were surprising. Because there was an assumption on my 
behalf as a researcher that the computing students knew the threat of malicious email 
attachments pose to them if they do not do thorough checks once they receive an email 
from a known or unknown recipient. A malicious attachment could contain dangerous 
attachments that can trigger keyloggers, ransomware, and other malware variants once 
opened by a victim (Ivanov et al., 2021). Anti-virus software cannot do thorough checks 




malware variants in phishing communication can bypass anti-virus technologies. It can 
take hours for anti-virus technology vectors to investigate new attacks and deploy updates 
or patches (Keepnet Labs, 2020).      
 
Prevention of Phishing Attacks suggestions from computing students  
 
Prevention of phishing attacks is if the university can promote or prevent people from 
being defrauded by different phishing attacks. Student 3 suggested to:  
 
‘Put up bulletins... But then again, like someone could use that as like a technique, 
if the uni is putting up bulletins they could put up a fake bulletin. But it's just, you 
can't really catch it, it's all user error like you need to sort of like train yourself to 
detect when there's like maybe like grammatical errors and like the spacing is 
wrong. Or like the link looks sketchy... because on Outlook, you can do redirects 
and like you need to have a look at that where it's redirecting to’. 
 
Student (3) suggested that university announcements against specific phishing variants 
can be helpful. However, cyber-criminals can exploit this by uploading fake bulletins. A 
student concluded that it is mainly user-error. If there are university bulletins about 
phishing attacks, some students will still click on links or download files from different 
phishing communication. The student added that a phishing variant detected from 
grammatical errors or the spacing could be wrong. These are for some types of phishing 
variants but not all of them.          
 
On the other hand, more phishing variants are becoming sophisticated and thus do not 
have grammatical or spacing errors. Moreover, a student said the user needs to look at 
where the link is redirecting the user. It can be problematic because the malicious link 
could contain a malware variant that can be executed and downloaded to the recipient’s 
system in a phishing email (Tierney, 2018). Or the link and the content of a phishing email 
may persuade a user to click on the link. The majority of phishing emails may include 
company domain names or logos to increase credibility and convince recipients. People 
are more likely to be motivated to accept the messages if the phishing emails use rational 
and emotional appeals. People may believe that the content of an email is relevant to 







Some users may unintentionally download plug-ins from third-party providers. It can lead 
to more vulnerabilities in the internet browser (Chiew, Yong and Tan, 2018). This type of 
phishing attack is difficult to detect and prevent even if the computer system is updated. 
An additional limitation of user training is not possible to educate all users about different 
security tools. Users may be confused with the range of security tools against phishing 
variants. If some users decide not to use security tools, they will be vulnerable to phishing 
attacks.     
 
Previous studies on user training have shown improvements in phishing detection, but 
most studies have not tested their user training against phishing variants for a specific 
time.  Studies on phishing training are based on scenarios and are about different phishing 
communication. It will be interesting if the participants are not informed about the test and 
observe users on how they will respond to phishing emails and their variants. Findings in 
most studies show that education is beneficial and is needed. But it is not a solution to 
phishing. Also, false positives can deter users from using security tools if they block users’ 
emails regularly or block them from visiting websites that are not phishing websites or 
associated with phishing domains (Purkait, 2012). Some of the challenges of education 
and training programs is ensuring that the research participants remember the information 
they have learned after the information provided from the user training about different 
types of phishing communication (Summer and Yuan, 2019).   
 
 
A student discussed blacklisting certain phishing domains can be used as a preventative 
security measure against some types of phishing variants:  
 
‘You could domains. Certain providers do blacklist certain domains if they know 
they are phishing domains.’  
 
However, a problem with crawling and blacklisting phishing domains could be that the 
anti-phishing organisations will find themselves combating different phishing attacks from 
online fraudsters daily. Plug-in browsers could detect phishing attacks based on 
blacklisted phishing domains, but they do not resolve the zero-day phishing attack (Ross 
and Jackson et al., 2005).  A web crawler or an internet bot can send automated scripts 
to browse webpages to find threats from phishing variants such as zero-day phishing. 
However, this may be ineffective against new phishing attacks with malware capable of 




A malformed URL prefix attack in phishing emails use tactics such as displaying fraudulent 
display names to trick users into thinking the email is internal. The phishing emails use 
unknown domains and senders to bypass filters that look for known malicious senders. 
Payloads within the links use open redirector domains. Phishing emails urged users to 
make a mistake. The phishing emails use prefixes to include a second forward slash in 
favour of a backslash. For example, http:/\ and then add a malicious URL into the prefix 
before and adds a legitimate domain name treated as subdirectories of a malicious page. 
It makes it possible to create a phishing website (Vigliarolo, 2021).   
 
 
Additionally, blacklisting approaches are only useful if they are maintained and updated 
regularly. A disadvantage of blacklisting different phishing domain are new phishing sites 
that are not blacklisted. New phishing websites could not be in the database from the 
blacklisting software that can avoid filters (Hämmerli and Sommer, 2007). The majority of 
phishing sites that are blacklisted are temporary and exist for less than 20 hours. Phishing 
sites change URLs regularly is known as fast flux (Moore and Clayton, 2007). The URL 
blacklisting approach fails to identify some phishing variants. The blacklisting approach 
fails to detect spear-phishing emails, especially when cyber-criminals’ targets sites such 
as company intranets (Afroz and Greenstadt, 2009). Phishing websites can grow in 
sophistication and can bypass defences (Oest et al., 2020).  
  
 
Protection against phishing attacks in focus group 
 
Student (3) suggested in order to be protected against phishing attacks is:  
 
‘Or maybe having like filters that catches certain words or phrases. But then again, 
that could start filtering emails which are not phishing emails, and if there is a 




The use of filters that attempts to prevent phishing emails is using filters and content 
analysis. Techniques used to intercept phishing emails are Bayesian filters. Nevertheless, 
the effectiveness of filtering phishing emails is on regular filter training and the availability 
of anti-spam tools. Filtering software is not perfect, and some phishing emails may bypass 
filters and reach victims (Hämmerli and Sommer, 2007). A problematic feature of email 




forget to update the filter periodically. It may result in them in becoming a victim of 
phishing. Some issues with filters are it generates false positive. It can result in to trust the 
use of filters less. Filters can often flag emails as phishing email, which can create 
inconvenience for users. Users may not use the anti-phishing filters if it repetitively blocks 
or deletes emails as phishing emails. Email filtering may not be useful for phishing 
detection. Filters used to classify email content based on keywords may filter words that 
appear in emails that not classified as spam or phishing. Fraudsters find strategies 
regularly to make phishing emails appear legitimate to bypass filters. For example, in a 
spam filtering system, attackers add irreverent words to evade system detection (Zhang 
et al., 2021). Most students are probably using anti-spam or phishing filters without 
realising it. These are installed at a mail server level. This may be used for the students’ 
university email servers.  
 
Data collected from anonymised questionnaires and focus group suggested that students 
did know about some phishing variants. In the focus group with computing students, 
several students did not know what spear phishing was. A student did define spear-
phishing email but did not explain the identifying features of a spear-phishing attack. The 
focus group found that the computing students provided recommendations for security 
software and preventive measures against phishing attacks, but their responses lacked 
clarity and shown their knowledge gap.   
 
 
Students said they would compartmentalise their system and only open emails that they 
know. It was a vague response and did not indicate whether the participants can identify 
spear-phishing emails which can appear in their personal or university emails. Some 
participants went off-topic about the discussion suggesting security measures against 
different types of phishing communication. Some preventive security recommendations 
made about some phishing variants, but these may be ineffective. The result of a focus 
group found that awareness from some students about phishing variants was limited. 
There was not enough time within the focus group to reach this conclusion. It was due to 
the allocated time (30 minutes) put aside with the focus group computing students. The 
specific time in the focus group was due to various reasons. The focus group was 30 
minutes because the students did not miss the majority of their lesson time. I did not want 
the focus group to take too long. A reason for it was they may become restless and may 
not provide useful feedback.  The focus group found they were nervous at the beginning 




the first 5 minutes of the focus group. It changed when the focus group progressed. The 
students began to participate and share their thoughts about different phishing 
communication.         
 
They did discuss security measures such as filtering software to block some phishing 
emails, but they did not explain precautions they should take if a phishing email bypasses 
filtering software. There was a gap in knowledge from a student. It could lead to further 
cyberattacks on the university database or other critical infrastructure if it is not dealt with 
accordingly. Anti-phishing filters may occasionally provide misleading confirming 
indicators that a phishing website is legitimate (Abu-Nimeh, 2008). The anonymised 
questionnaires results may suggest that students who had security software on their 
electronic devices may be vulnerable to phishing attacks such as vishing, smishing, 
pharming and spear-phishing. Different types of sophisticated phishing communication 
can bypass firewalls and anti-phishing filters. They can perform malicious activities on a 
victim’s device.  Some students are not aware that they have received a phishing 
communication. The students are more likely to be defrauded by phishing variants. 
Phishing is a common and easy way for cybercriminals to bypass security measures 
(Symantec, 2016; Blog, 2016; Verizon, 2015). Phishing email variants are efficient 
because they exploit human psychology and make phishing communication appear 
trustworthy (Jagatic et.,2007).    
 
 
Cybercriminals use sophisticated methods to send a phishing email that replaces links 
with malicious links that redirect a victim to a phishing webpage that may use real 
company logos (Mehan, 2016). The results from the anonymised questionnaires and 
focus group found that students did not mention how they should be cautious from 
sophisticated phishing email variants redirecting them to a phishing webpage. A student’s 
perception of phishing susceptibility may not be on a phishing communication encounter. 
But it can be influenced by their existing beliefs of phishing. The user learns and updates 
their phishing susceptibility by incorporating the experience with a new phishing email 
variant. An issue of this learning experience is likely to be different among students. Thus 
they may be defrauded to new phishing email variants (Kim and Kim, 2013). Spear 
phishing emails are sophisticated in their design and approach compared to generic 
phishing emails, making them difficult to identify. The attack vectors from spear-phishing 
emails are perpetually evolving. Spear-phishing emails can be a cyber threat to students 




Some students defrauded by phishing variants in anonymised questionnaires and a focus 
group. It is because of underlying factors.  One reason is phishing detection and when a 
student completes the task intended by the fraudster.  Some students defrauded by 
phishing emails:  download a file by clicking on a link, downloading a picture that may 
contain viruses, trojans, spyware and worm and provide personal information or login 
information.  It could happen when students cannot identify the inconsistencies of the 
email content. A student may not identify phishing cues in the phishing email. In some 
cases, a student may know an email is fraudulent but superseded by the perceived 
credibility of the content of a phishing email. Another factor that may lead to students’ 
failure to identify phishing emails. They may not have the ability to verify some fraudulent 
phishing emails like a spear-phishing email (Wang et al., 2009).    
 
 
Other factors of students falling for phishing attacks could be from Canterbury Christ 
University policies. It does not include how students and staff can identify different types 
of phishing emails and how students and staff can report phishing emails to IT staff and 
from their university email. There are several reasons that the university policies might not 
provide enough information and advice about threats from phishing attacks. The policy 
zone section is not easy to find on the website. The user has to navigate to the bottom of 
the website. The policies on guidance on IT regulations and the email policy are 
generalised and does not include any information about different types of phishing 
variants. The email policy (2013) is outdated and does not explicitly include information 




The university website does not have a section where students can report malicious 
phishing emails to IT staff members. Additionally, the university policy is not clear about 
how the students can report a phishing email and their variants to the university. Students 
have to agree to the ‘Fair Use Policies’ when they get a new university account. The 
policies must be accepted when students log in to a computer.  An issue with most policy 
documents and terms and conditions is that some students deliberately skip them when 






On the other hand, there is an ‘phishing button’ in the students’ Microsoft Outlook 
University student email account whereby students can report incidents of suspected 
phishing emails, but this may not be noticeable by some students because the phishing 
button is not easy to find if students have installed the university mail client app on their 
personal computers or if they are using the mail client on a webpage online.    
    
Conclusion 
 
The study found a range of factors in which students might fall victim to different types of 
phishing attacks. Results from the focus group identified that the majority of students with 
exception of one student did not know what spear-phishing was. In the focus group the 
students failed to recognise spear-phishing emails. Similarly, a spear-phishing scenario 
question was asked in the questionnaire and found that most students fall victim to the 
spear-phishing attack. Awareness about spear phishing emails from the focus group and 
the questionnaires could be because of different reasons such as lack of knowledge and 
awareness about spear phishing emails, the layout, cues that may be used and the 
appearance of the email can make it difficult for some users to detect spear phishing 
emails. Some students are not be able to identify the fraudulent features of spear phishing 
emails.  
 
Additionally, when students were asked about smishing text messages a small portion of 
participants mentioned anti-smishing software which can be used against smishing 
attacks. Anonymised data collected from the focus group and questionnaires illustrated 
that the majority of participants either did not know or mentioned about the features of a 
smishing text message. Some students might be a victim to a smishing attack based on 
the results in the anonymised questionnaire because they said they would have either 
opened the link in the text message or pay for the delivery cost of an item they would have 
been expecting to be delivered to them. 
 
User education and training about social engineering attacks from different types of 
phishing attacks can be used to explain the need of taking security measures but changing 
the users’ knowledge and understanding does not mean that they will change their 
behaviour. The majority of organisations provide security instructions to users and they 
expect these instructions to be followed. This can be problematic as some users may have 
a set of beliefs and attitudes who do not comply with security policies (Weirich and Sasse, 




could illustrate that some users do not believe that they are personally at risk against 
phishing attacks. They could think that they will be not held accountable if they do not 
follow security regulations or use anti-phishing to protect themselves from some types of 
phishing variants (Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005). A study carried out by Furnell (2007) about 
users being able to identify phishing is similar to this study when participants are asked 
about different types of phishing communication. The results from the questionnaires and 
the focus group found that the majority of the students might be lacking the basic level of 
security and general awareness against some types phishing variants. 
 
 
Some of the limitations of phishing-related educational and awareness training shown 
limited success in terms of reducing susceptibility to different types of phishing (Williams 
and Joinson 2020). NCSC guidance in relation to the challenges and limitations of anti-
phishing education by overwhelming users in a complex threat landscape from social-
engineering attacks (NCSC, 2018), it is necessary to use a mixture of technical defences 
with user awareness and education about phishing attacks which are used regularly by 
fraudsters and how to report them is highlighted (NCSC, 2016). There may be a lack of 
evidence user training about different phishing communication can reduce the phishing 
threat and the extent in which students are likely to engage with the awareness and 
education interventions. Thus, it is fundamental to consider if students currently view 
phishing-related information, and if they engage with the content and various factors that 
may influence this (Williams and Joinson 2020). 
 
 
The perception of different types of phishing emails from students differed. The statistical 
information collected from the focus group and questionnaires found that there was a split 
between respondents who are aware of some types of phishing variants but are unable to 
provide further insight into how they can be identified and security software that can be 
used against different types of phishing. Other participants who did not have knowledge 
about anti-phishing software are more likely to be victims of phishing emails. This was 
reflected in the questionnaire results whereby the participants simply downloaded an 
email attachment to their electronic devices. Nonetheless, some participants who said that 
they have security software on their electronic devices, and they stated that they have 
technical knowledge about phishing emails did say that they would download email 
attachments from people that they know. The reason for this might be that they may not 




appear to be from someone they know. Also, it can be due to effectiveness of phishing 
because of the cognitive nature of phishing variants to encourage students to download 
attachments on their electronic devices. A phishing email manipulates a user’s perception 
and relies on the user’s changed actions to carry out further attacks (Cybenko et al., 2002). 
 
 
Perception of phishing variants is explored in the study which reviewed factors that may 
influence students engage with information presented to them in a phishing variant. It 
might be possible that a lack of engagement with information sources about phishing 
variants might have contributed to their limited effectiveness (Williams and Joinson 2020). 
The data sample from the focus group and anonymised questionnaires investigated who 
may be defrauded by fraudsters from different phishing variants which hide malicious 
content and send phishing communication to appear to be from a trustworthy source and 
may have had resulted in students who may not identify it as a phishing variant. The 
susceptibility of students to some phishing variants is when they have difficulties detecting 
fraudulent communication from cybercriminals. Some students were unaware of the threat 
from phishing variants and thus they are more likely to have their personal information to 
be targeted by fraudsters and they may lack the perspective needed to identity threats 
from phishing attacks and may not take precautions such as using security tools when 
carrying out online activities.  
 
 
Recommendations are on the anonymised data collected from the anonymised 
questionnaires and the focus group. The email to the head of IT includes a summary of 
the results and findings of the study. An email sent can find solutions for phishing 
communications attacks when the current research has finished. The head of IT in 
Canterbury Christ Church University can review and may change or adapt the existing 
phishing policy in the university. One positive impact of the study is it may lead to policy 
change in the university which can reduce the possibility of students being victimised from 
phishing attacks in the future. Also, the existing phishing policy if updated or adapted from 
the head of IT in Canterbury Christ Church University might make the university more 
resistant against sophisticated phishing attacks. Another recommendation from the 
current study could be anti-phishing software installed on university computers to filter and 
block some phishing attacks. An additional recommendation to the current research is to 
organise online training sessions at Canterbury Christ Church University. Online training 




discuss the dangers of phishing attacks and preventive measures against phishing 
variants to avoid students being a victim of phishing communication in the university.         
 
 
Another positive impact this research has made is it found a gap in knowledge from 
specific phishing attacks. A possible solution is online training sessions with students to 
be aware of new phishing attacks deployed by hackers. It can be done online due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic and encourage students to complete training programmes about 
phishing attacks online. The training will be optional for students who may wish to take the 
training courses in their university courses induction programmes. In the current study’s 
recommendations section, Caldwell’s (2013) study is used as a recommendation to 
introduce student training sessions about phishing attacks they may receive in their 
student emails or personal emails that may further cyberattack without their knowledge. 
To address a gap in awareness about different phishing attacks, students can have 
training sessions at university. It can be beneficial for students because phishing emails 
and their variants are evolving continuously from cybercriminals.       
 
 
I have learnt that there were some gaps in knowledge from some students within the data 
collection sample. Some phishing attacks that users are not aware of sent from hackers 
and could be problematic for the university. However, students can know about the cyber-
threats of phishing attacks by informing the university IT team that can organise 
workshops with students to be aware of different types of phishing attacks.      
 
I have learnt that security countermeasures against phishing attacks may not be enough 
to prevent students from being victims of phishing fraud. It requires the recipient of a 
phishing communication to carefully read and analyse the fraudulent communication so 
the victim could avoid phishing attack variants.  Additionally, due to the surge of new zero-
day phishing attacks, it is sometimes difficult to avoid being a victim of phishing fraud. 
Online fraudsters are using new methods to steal personal information and to launch 
further cyber-attacks against unsuspecting victims. For example, some cybercriminals use 
malicious tools that use AI (Artificial intelligence) to launch phishing attacks (Yamin et al., 
2021). I have learnt that there is a gap in knowledge for some specific types of phishing 
attacks towards victims; it can be problematic because it may lead to further cyber-attacks 





The study collated a specific sample size of students who are studying policing, 
criminology and computing. This enabled the analysis of the research to focus on their 
perception and awareness of phishing attack variants. The advantage of focusing upon a 
specific student population was it enabled me to gain a focused insight and understanding 
into the gap in knowledge from the students when they were questioned about different 
types of phishing attacks. These outputs can be developed further in future studies and 
used by law enforcement agencies in the future to mitigate and reduce the threat of 
phishing at a larger scale.  
 
 
Limitations and Further Studies 
 
 
The study focused on a specific population of students from the School of Law, Policing 
and Social Sciences and computing students. This limitation is a result of the use of 
anonymised questionnaires and a focus group as a data collection approach on a small 
portion of the student population from Canterbury Christ Church University which could 
have looked at different departments in the university to find out their awareness and 
perception of different phishing variants. The results collected in the current research did 
not provide full evidence for the awareness levels and perception of phishing variants from 
universities nationwide in the UK. Future studies could look at universities nationwide in 
the UK to find out students’ awareness and perception of phishing variants to validate the 
current findings. Other studies can be sponsored by the UK government which can 
conduct research on a wider scale from online users and their awareness and perception 
of different phishing attacks in different locations in the UK. However, to indirectly address 
this issue, the study focused on a specific number of university students to generate 
detailed analysis of the results from a focus group and anonymised questionnaires in order 
to find out the underlying factors in which students fall victim to different types of phishing 
attacks as well as the reviewing what governments and police agencies worldwide do to 









Unfortunately, due to the lack of resources, time and funding I am unable to make 
comparison between students in different countries on their awareness levels of phishing 
attacks. However, this can be done by law enforcement government research funded 
agencies who work for Europol, Interpol and the NCA. Moreover, the research might be 
proven to be useful for banking cyber-defence and digital forensics sectors who analyse 
and might deal with malware variants from phishing attacks. Thus, the awareness of 
phishing fraud is essential to banking staff as well as digital forensics experts who need 
victims to be aware of certain phishing attacks. This may not always be preventable due 
to zero-day phishing attacks and sophisticated malware variants which has not been 
detected by firewalls or digital forensics employees themselves. 
 
 
Future studies may explore data from annual financial cost of phishing globally and 
correspond to the number of victims who had been defrauded by phishing variants. 
Similarly, new studies are needed to address limited information about the impact of 
different phishing attacks on students studying at universities aboard compared to 
universities in the UK and if they reported phishing attacks. Reporting of phishing variants 
to international police forces and government agencies around the world investigating 
different phishing attacks can be evaluated and the process itself could be reviewed to 
see if it is effective to reduce the number of victims from phishing variants and as a result 
future studies could review the money saved from reducing the number of victims being 
defrauded by different phishing communication by cybercriminals.  
 
 
Another future study which was not explored in the study could be about cyber risk from 
Dark Web marketplaces that may lead to different types phishing attacks from 
cybercriminals and the role of international police forces and governments that may carry 
out surveillance or take down some illegal financial services which are operated on the 











Other future studies could evaluate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the wider 
student population in universities and the rise in phishing attacks that use coronavirus 
themed subjects and content within phishing variants which are designed by 
cybercriminals for malicious purposes. Future studies could look at international threat 
actors behind global COVID-19 phishing campaigns which use different tactics to evade 
detection by using sophisticated email templates and attachments such as a compressed 
file as a link (LNK file) or .rtf file extension directs to a powershell.exe with obfuscated data 
as parameters (Thaware, 2020). The malicious attachments could be forensically 
examined which may use URL obfuscation using PowerShell script. Mitigation and 
defence strategies against COVID-19 phishing variants could be recommenced in the 
studies. Furthermore, it may be useful to share intelligence and work collaboratively with 
law enforcement agencies, private companies and public cyber defence companies which 
may specialise in tracing phishing attacks from organised international criminal 
syndicates, individuals, or hacker groups. However, this may be proven to be problematic 
if some countries have different rules on their cyber law enforcement laws.  
 
 
On the other hand, cooperation leads to arrests and according to Interpol’s Financial 
Crime unit (2020) stated the importance of a coordinated response to phishing this is 
taking into account: security countermeasures, inadequate anti-virus controls or anti-
malware applications, key staff working with critical infrastructure and network 
vulnerabilities which may breach a database further if stronger countermeasures is not 
put in place once a victim clicks on a link or falls victim to a specific phishing attack. Thus, 
future studies could look at the underlying factors from students on a wider scale within 
universities. However, according to Europol’s IOCTA publication (2020) phishing has 
become challenging to detect because the majority of phishing emails and phishing sites 
are almost identical to the real ones. Also, phishing campaigns created by cybercriminals 
are automated and produced at a faster rate which may force respondents to act quicker 
than before and in some cases it takes one day which can lead to a credential leak from 









A future study from the current study is another data collection method which may come 
into useful is structured interview with victims of phishing and how they received support 
from the police and independent non-governmental organisations. 
 
The study found a range of awareness levels from students about phishing attacks and 
what they consider as security countermeasures to avoid becoming a victim of phishing 
fraud.  Also, the study can be proven to be effective because it can be used to explore a 
wider populous of students and this may result in a deeper insight into why some students 
become victim to different types of phishing attacks. One of the positive impacts of this 
study is the College of Policing, UK Government researchers and some European 
universities or international universities can use this study and increase the sample size 
nationally and even internationally for example comparing the victims of phishing fraud in 
Germany universities and UK universities and analyse their awareness levels of different 
types of phishing communication from fraudsters.  
 
Limitations of the study is the paper based questionnaire wording could be seen as 
misleading in terms of making students into thinking for example making a informed 
decision and response to a specific scenario based question is a spear phishing email or 
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The study abided by the Canterbury Christ Church University Ethics principles. The study 
received approval from ethics the university ethics committee by contacting them via 
email with a completed a ‘Ethics Review Checklist’ application and supporting 
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Appendix B: Data Protection Act (2018) and GDPR (2016) compliance in the study 
 
 
The study ensured that participants responses in the anonymised questionnaire are 
anonymous and did not personally identify the participants in the research. The 
respondents were provided with information at the beginning of the questionnaire about 
consent to take part in the study. The individuals in the study given clear consent to 
process their anonymised personal data from the questionnaire and the focus group 
which was when respondents provided consent when asked if they wanted to take part in 
the research before the focus group started for a specific purpose of gauging the students 
awareness levels of different types of phishing. The anonymised questionnaire has a 
confidentiality section that included information about how the data and personal 
information of students in the study will be encrypted and stored securely in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act 2018, GDPR (2016) and the Canterbury Christ Church 
University’s own data protection requirements. The anonymised data from the focus 
group and anonymised questionnaires from policing, criminology and computing students 
will be used to answer the research questions and make recommendations for further 
















Appendix C: Consent Details 
 
 
Title of Project: Awareness and perception of phishing variants from policing, computing and 
criminology students in Canterbury Christ Church University 
 
 






Canterbury Centre for Policing Research (CCPR),  
Canterbury Christ Church University,  
North Holmes Road,  
Canterbury, Kent CT1 1QU 
  















By completing this survey, I agree to the following: 
 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have 
had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason. 
 
I understand that any personal information that you provide to me for my thesis will be kept 
strictly confidential.  
 
TITLE: Awareness and perception of phishing variants from policing, computing and 
criminology students in Canterbury Christ Church University 
 






This research will survey students within the School of Law, Policing and Social Sciences at 
Canterbury Christ Church University. The research is about phishing and its variants. 
 
What will you be required to do?  
 
 
You are required to answer the questions on the questionnaire about phishing emails and its 
variants. Some questions will be about how you keep yourself safe online and if you use 




To participate in this research, you must: 
 
 
Be a student at Canterbury Christ Church University and studying a criminology or policing 




Feedback and dissemination of results 
 
 
You can request feedback via email about the questionnaire and questions about how 






All data and personal information will be stored securely within CCCU premises in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018, General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) and the University’s own data protection requirements. All data from the 
questionnaire will be confidential (i.e., all of the responses from the questionnaire will be 
anonymous). 
 
Deciding whether to participate 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the nature, procedures or requirements for 
participation do not hesitate to contact me. Should you decide to participate, you will be 





Any questions? Please contact: 
 
Nima Movassagh from the School of Law, Policing and Social Sciences via email: 
n.movassagh362@canterbury.ac.uk  I will be interested to speak to anyone who wished 
to be interviewed at a later stage. 
 
 
Brief information about research: This questionnaire is about different types of phishing 
communication or emails you may receive on a day-to day basis. 
 
 
















Appendix D: Questionnaire 
 
 
1. UK Government websites provides advice and information for people about 
different types of fraudulent emails, text messages and calls you can receive from 
online criminals. Is the government doing enough to make users aware of phishing 
emails and their variants? 
 
Please circle one of the following: or indicate that you are unsure below. 
 
Yes— No— I do not know 
 












2. Scenario: You have received an email from a purchase you have made online for 
an item you have ordered during the Christmas period. The email contains general 
item information such as: the order number and date purchased. The email advices 
you to click on the link on the email to check the delivery progress of your item. 
Would you click on the link? 
 




























3. Have you received any phishing emails? 
 
Please circle one of the following or indicate that you are unsure below. 
 
Yes— No—I do not know 
 



























4. What would you do if you receive a text from a delivery company ( i.e., Royal 
Mail, FedEx, UPS, DPD or Hermes) for an item you have ordered online stating 
that you have to pay 0.50p delivery fees by following a link- 
https://FedEx.org.uk/9991011110111 to receive the item today before 10:00AM, 
and the delivery ID in the text is #10010 and if the delivery fees are not paid in 
time then the item will be sent back to the sender. 
 
 
What would you do next? Please explain your answer below. 
 























5. What would you do if you receive an email with an attachment? 
 












6. What precautions should you take to avoid phishing emails and their variants: 
‘SMiShing’ (SMS phishing), Vishing, Spear Phishing and Pharming? 
 
 















7. Scenario: You have received an email from your PayPal account that your 
account has encountered an error in their system. In the email they say if this 
problem is not resolved, they will close your account. This is due to the account 
being inactive for some time. In the email PayPal mention that their verification 
process has encountered a technical problem because they are unable to verify 
your information. As a result, your account cannot function correctly and can lead 


























8. Do you use security safeguards (firewalls and/or VPN-Virtual Private Network) on 
your electronic devices that you may use on a daily basis in order to prevent you 
from receiving different types of phishing communication via email, phone or from 
text messages? 
 
Please circle one of the following or indicate that you are unsure below. 
 
Yes— No—I do not know 
 
 
























9. What would you do if you receive an urgent email from your bank which states 































Appendix E: Question 2 Students Response Data. 
 
 
1. I’m unsure.  
 
2. I am unsure. I would only click on it if the email was the official site email.  
 
3. I am unsure. Depending on whether the email was from the company I ordered 
the item from them I would but if it wasn’t I wouldn’t.  
 
4. Yes. I would click on the link.  
 
5. No. I wouldn’t.  
 
6. Yes. I will click the link to check the delivery of my item.  
 
7. Yes. Yeah, I want to check the delivery process of my item.  
 
8. No. I’ll use the website I ordered from to track.  
 
9. No. Most things I order I can track via other means or apps.  
 
10. No. It’s not necessary to click on the link as it could include something dodgy. 
 
11.  No. Because I am not usually that bothered when an item comes when I order 
unless it’s very late. Also, because it may not be a real email from the person, I 
bought it from.  
 
12. No. I don’t need to know where the package is just long as I get it.  
 
13. No. I never open email links, always go to the website. 
 
14. No. As the email link may contain malware that then downloads onto your pc. But 
it would depend on the authenticity of the look of the email. To depend on 
whether I would think it was actually that company.   
 
15. No. Never click on links to emails unless its sender is verified.  
 
16. No. I don’t tend to track my items unless they are late. I would then call or email 
the relevant people.  
 
17. No. I usually sign up for text notification to have an email send through wouldn’t 
look right.  
 




19. No. I wouldn’t click on the link without being certain it is legit.  
 
20. No. I always press the email address to see who has actually send the email.  
 
21. No. Always weary of phishing emails.  
 
22. No. Would only click on the link if the website was secure and had a lock. 
 
23. No. I’ll first search up on google to see if others receive emails such as this to 
ensure that it is legit.  
 
24. No, I would check that the email address was legitimate first.  
 
25. No. If it didn’t look legitimate, I feel I would know. Also, I don’t care about 
checking the delivery process usually.  
 
 
26. No. I only usually click emails after dispatch where relevant info is given.  
 
27. No. Because it could be a scam and could possibly be scammers obtaining your 
bank details, or personal information.  
 
28. No. Because I would be very worried that it was a scam.  
 
29. No. Because I didn’t request any changes and would wait for the delivery I would 
only contact the company on non-delivery or not happy with product.  
 
30. No. Because I don’t need to and is a chance to be a scam.  
 
31. No. Because I can check the progress on the website which I bought the item 
and not in my email. 
 
 
32. No. Delivery process does not bother me, it arrives when it arrives.  
 
33. No. Unless its directly from delivery company or order company.  
 
34. No. Because the link is probably a virus and there is a chance at getting a virus 
to your phone. Also get your personal details and location. Especially if it’s an 
iPhone and you have an apple pay, the virus can probably take the card details.  
 
35. No. I don’t click any link within my emails. 
 
36. No. I would need more details to track the order.  
 




38. Yes. Because I’d want to know the terms and conditions of the delivery process. 
 
39. Yes. I probably wouldn’t think anything of it unless it clearly looked dodgy.  
 
40. Yes. if it seems to be the genuine company.  
 
41. Yes. As long as it is a genuine email.  
 
42. Yes. I would like to see how far away my parcel is and who’s hands it is in.  
 
43. Yes. If I bought the item. I want to check where it is.  
 
44. Yes. Yes, if I knew it was definitely from the company I ordered from.  
 
45. Yes. I expect it would be from a trusted source.  
 
46. Yes. To find out when delivery is.  
 
47. Yes. Only if I have pressed the link before on that specific website.  
 
48. Yes. Because It contains 2 unique bits of information and its coming from an 
email address I recognise.  
 
49. Yes. I would press the link if I was 100% sure that it was genuine.  
 
50. Yes. I would want to track my parcel.  
 
51. Yes. Because it’s to track your parcel so usually there is nothing ‘fishy’ or criminal 
about doing that.  
 
52. Yes. If bought it, I’d expect it to be what I ordered.  
 
53. Yes. However, it depends if the email is legit from the usual email and if it looks 
secure.  
 
54. Yes. Out of the panic I would check but only if the email seemed okay.  
 
55. Yes. I would because it has the details of my purchase and during Christmas, I’d 
like to know the delivery progress.  
 
56. Yes. Only if it was from the company, I bought it from. 
 
57. Yes. Because it seems alright.  
 




59. Yes. If it was email from the company, I made the purchase from that contained 
the correct info and data then I would trust it. 
 
60. Yes. So, you can track what stage your delivery is at.  
 
61. Yes. If I had brought something from a trusted site, I would click on an email from 
them.  
 
62. Yes. Always eager to see the progress on the delivery.  
 
63. Yes. Expecting to be informed about the product ordered. 
 
64. Yes. I would like to see where my delivery is if the sender looks legitimate, I 
would trust it.  
 
65. Yes. Because having paid for the product I would want to know where it is.  
 
66. Yes. Because I do online shopping and know the website do provide link to find 
out the delivery process of the purchase.  
 
67. Yes. I would trust it was from the company as I had purchased the item.  
 
68. Yes. As long as the notice seemed legitimate and professional. I would likely 
access it to be genuine.  
 
69. Yes. I will have to check who email is from it is usually visible if email is 
fraudulent.  
 
70. Yes. I always like to check my order’s details and make sure I’ve been charged 
properly.  
 
71. Yes. I would click the link because I would recognise that order most tracking 
links can be safe.  
 
72. Yes, because I would like to know where the product I purchased is.  
 
73. Yes. Because I would assume it was legit as I know I had purchased the item 
previously.  
 
74. Yes. Yes, because it contains my order. Plus, if all my details were on there then 
it seems legit.  
 
75. Yes. Yes, if the email address it is send from the company email and all the info 




76. Yes. To be kept up to date with the delivery progress.  
 
77. No. I wouldn’t randomly click on an email. I would look at who it had been sent 
from to check its credibility. If I was unsure, I would just leave it.  
 
78.  Yes. We order a lot of things around Christmas time so I would check what it is, 
but if I had no memory of the purchase, I might check my bank statement first.  
 
79. Yes. I want to know how far processed my order is and if it is out for delivery yet.  
 
80. Yes. I would want to know the progress of my order. 
 
81. Yes. To see when it would be delivered.  
 
82. Yes. To see what’s happening with the delivery. I wouldn’t assume it’s a scam.  
 
83. Yes. I would click on the link to see the delivery progress of the item, but I would 
check the email address first etc as I would be unsure.  
 
84. Yes. I would if it was a legit invoice or email confirmation of purchase made and 
your details were provided.  
 
85. Yes. I wouldn’t think anything strange about it and would want to track my 
delivery.  
 
86. Yes. If it is a website I have bought off before, then I will click the link.  
 
87. Yes. Why wouldn’t you? You shouldn’t have to suspect everything you receive is 
spam or not legit. 
 
88. Yes. If it looks legitimate and I just ordered from that site I would.  
 
89. Yes. I probably would, unless the email looked dodgy.  
 
90. Yes. Cause I’d want to know when it would be delivered.  
 
91. Yes. I’d like to know if my package has been shipped.  
 
92. Yes. I would click the link in order to track my order and know when it is getting to 
me. I would also click the link because it has all the correct information on it and I 
trust it.  
 
93. Yes. So, I can track my order.  
 




95. Yes. Need to find out about my order.  
 
96. Yes. I would only check if it has not arrived after a prolonged period of time.  
 
97. Yes. I always do because out of curiosity but only if it’s for UPS, DPD, Royal 
Mail, Amazon or other ‘big company’.  
 
98. Yes. To track my parcel.  
 
99. Yes. I have ordered item online and one of the steps I have to often take is to 
click on a link that keeps me up to date on the progress of my delivery.  
 
100. Yes. I would believe it is legit as I ordered the item. 
 
101. Yes. I would believe that due to the information being correct it would be 
genuine.  
 
102. Yes. I usually track my deliveries so this wouldn’t seem like an unusual 
email to receive.  
 
103. Yes. The use of the order number etc. would lead me to believe it is 
legitimate.  
 
104. Yes. If from the official website I would believe it wasn’t a scam.  
 
105. Yes. If it was a legit email.  
 
106. Yes. Because I ordered the product.  
 
107. Yes, because it was sent to my personal emails.  
 
108.  Yes. Yes, if the email is from the company and written correctly. 
 
109. Yes. I want to know where my parcel is and I trust the stores I buy from.  
 
110. Yes. If the email came from the company email address and all of the 
correct information.  
 
111. Yes. If the email was from the company, I purchased the item from. 
 
112. Yes, I would like to know where my order is. If I haven’t received it yet.  
 
113. Yes. I would click the link because if it contains my order number it would 




114. Yes. As long as I am 100 per cent sure it’s from the shop I ordered from. I 
would check senders email address first.  
 
115. Yes. Seems like a legit email. 
 
116. Yes. I trust the email.  
 
117. Yes. So, I can track my delivery and make sure I will be home for it.  
 
118. Yes. If it seems legit I would and if it was a purchase from a known 
website.  
 
119. Yes. Only if the order numbers matched up and if I was aware, I had 
tracked delivery otherwise no I wouldn’t.  
 
120. Yes. This is because I am aware that it was sent by the company. And 
majority of websites let you track the delivery status like that.  
 
121. Yes. I wouldn’t have thought any differently about it as it always seems 
legitimate.  
 
122. Yes. If I recognise the company in which I have ordered the item before 
then I will click it. If I don’t recognise the company or haven’t been notified that 
they will be delivery my order, then I won’t click it.  
 
123. Yes. If it is from the website, I purchased the item from I would check the 
tracking information to see how long the delivery takes.  
 
124. Yes. If the email includes information regarding the order, I would assume 
the link would be legitimate.  
 
125. Yes. To check my delivery order, I made.  
 
126. Yes. I would like to be aware of where my parcel is and when it will be 
delivered.  
 
127. Yes. Online receipts or a tracking page is usually sent so I would open it to 
track the parcel.  
 
128. Yes. I would like to see the date it is expected to arrive.  
 
129. Yes. If it looks legit. 
 
130. Yes. I want my item.  
 




132. Yes. If emails is normal.  
 
133. Yes. I would usually assume that checking the delivery progress is 
harmless as I am not providing them with information that they do not already 
have.  
 
134. Yes. I want to know where my parcel is.  
 
135. Yes. Yes, because I would like to know where my item is and when it’s 
arriving.  
 
136. Yes. To check my order.  
 
137. Yes. Would want to know when its arriving.  
 
138. Yes. I want to see when my item is arriving.  
 
139. Yes. I would want to know when my parcel would be delivered.  
 
140. Yes. Only if it looks like the company.  
 
141. Yes. I want to make sure my parcel arrives on time.  
 
142. Yes. I would click the link if it looked like it was real and from the company.  
 
143. Yes. As it looks like it’s from the company because of the amount of 
information it gives.  
 
144. Yes. I would assume it is the confirmation. 
 
145. Yes. I would want to check the delivery progress of the item.  
 
146. Yes. I would open the email as this relates to my purchase. 
 
147. Yes. Want to know where my purchase is.  
 
148. Yes. Only if the link was clean and the email sender was correct- basically 
if the email looked trustworthy (no typos). 
 
149. Yes. I want to make sure my order is going to be delivered.  
 
150. Yes. If they have the correct order number, then I would assume it was a 
real email. 
 




152. Yes. Once I have checked who the email has come from. I would most 
likely click on the link because it is not requiring me to enter details. 
 
153. Yes. Only if the details are extensive- includes delivery address, purchase 
method- and the logo exists.  
 
154. Yes. If it was an email from the company I ordered if from I would open it.  
 
155. No. I would not to be sure it would be a legitimate email. I have made the 
mistake before and the email was a virus.  
 
156. Yes. If includes details specifically and is known.  
 
157. Yes. To track where my parcel is.  
 
158. Yes. To see when the item is being delivered.  
 
159. Yes. If it looks like a legit site, and legit link/email then yes, I would.  
 
160. Yes. If the order email was from the company I ordered from then yes.  
 
161. Yes. I often click the link in my emails to keep updated on the delivery 
progress.  
 
162. Yes. I often click on the link to check upon my delivery progress.  
 
163. Yes. Yes, provided that the parcel has been dispatched and that the 
website is encrypted.  
 
164. Yes. I trust the website.  
 
165. Yes. I want to track my item.  
 
166. Yes. Because I trusted the site and want to know where my parcel is.  
 
167. Yes. Because I want to check the progress of my item.  
 
168. Yes. To see where my parcel is. 
 
169. Yes. I want to make sure I am at home to receive the order.  
 
170. Yes. Yes, if the email was from a legitimate company.  
 




172. Yes. I would click on the link to track my delivery.  
 
173. Yes. I would click the link because I want to track my delivery for my item. 
I trust that the link is legitimate before I click on the link. 
 
174. Yes. Want to see where it is.  
 
175. Yes. I like to track my delivery.  
 
176. Yes. So I know where my package is and when it will delivered.  
 
177. Yes. I want to find out where my parcel is.  
 
 
Appendix F: Question 5 Students Response Data  
 
Key: Open, Not Open, Check Source, Other. 
 
1. Open the attachment. 
2. Click on it. 
3. Not open it. 
4. If it was from an expected source, then yes.  
5. Depends who it’s from. 
6. Make sure the attachment is from someone I expected it to come from.  
7. If a spam, then I would delete. 
8. I would not open it for potential viruses.  
9. Depends who it I from. If I recognise it I would open it.  
10. Open it.  
11. Don’t click on the attachment until you know it’s legit. 
12. I wouldn’t open it unless it was from a legit website.  
13. Not click it.  
14. Only click if I know the sender.  
15. If it was from an address, I recognised I would open it, if it wasn’t, I would ignore 
it.  
16. It depends on the sender of the email. I wouldn’t open it.  
17. I would click on it to see.  
18. Not open unless I trust it.  
19. Open it if it was familiar e.g., familiar company or person.  
20. Depends what/who the email is from if I recognise the sender, I would open it.  
21. Not open it and delete straight away.  
22. Unless I trust the sender, leave it alone.  
23. Check who the email is from and what the email says. Only open attachment if 
it’s legitimate.  
24. Open it depending on who it was from.  
 




26. Unless it was from someone, I knew like a family member I would delete without 
opening it 
 
27. Dependant on email. Majority of time I would ignore it.  
 
28. Usually open it if it is expected. 
 
29. Depends on who it is from- stranger=not open it. Someone I know=open it  
 
30. Not click it as it seems a bit odd. I don’t typically trust attachments on an email.  
31. Do not click on the attachment depending on the type of email.  
 
32. Click it.  
 
33. Depending on the email. It looks legit then yes.  
 
34. If I know the person who’s send it I will open it if not I will delete it.  
 
35. Most likely open it, if it shows importance.  
 
36. I would assume it was a virus or an attempt to gain information off me and so 
would not click on it.  
 
37. Depends on email.  
 
38. Ignore it unless I thought I knew what it was in relation to i.e. not a scam.  
 
39. Open it. 
 
40. Open it.  
 
41. I would check who it’s from if I don’t know or recognise the sender, I would delete 
it.  
 
42. Depending on who it was from and if I was subscribed to something, I would 
open it.  
 
43. Look at the attachment if the email is relevant. 
 
44. Do not open link, can be a scam. 
 
45. It would depend on the context. If I’m expecting an email with a link from a 




46. Depends who the email was from. Mostly, I would open the link however, if I feel 
like its dodgy I won’t. 
 
47. Depends on who the person who is sending the email is, if I recognise them then 
I might but if I don’t then I won’t open the link. With chain emails even if its from 
someone I recognise, if it looks weird, I won’t open it.  
 
 
48. Depends on who the person who is sending the email is, if I recognise them then 
I might but if I don’t then I won’t open the link. With chain emails even if it’s from 
someone I recognise, if it looks weird, I won’t open it.  
 
49. If I didn’t know who it was from or expect it I wouldn’t open it.  
 
50. I would not even bother to open attachments I would be suspicious.  
 
51. Not open it unless I know the email address personally or I know I have been in 
contact with someone who has sent it over.  
 
52. Maybe open it if it seems legit. 
 
53. Email them or do a web live chat.  
 
54. Depends what the email address was.  
 
55. Open it if I knew it was safe (from a known email).  
 
56. See what it is. 
 
57. Open the attachment.  
 
58. Wouldn’t open it.  
 
59. I would tap the email on google to see if it is not a fraud.  
 
60. Probably wouldn’t open the link if I had not heard of the sender. 
 
61. Depending where and who the emails from open it.  
 
62. Depends on the email.  
 
63. It depends who I received the email from. If it was someone I knew/website I 
recognised, I would open it.  
 




65. Open the attachment. 
 
66. Only people I trust.  
 
67. If I didn’t know who the email was from, I wouldn’t open it.  
 
68. It depends on who the email is from, if I don’t recognise it I would not open.  
 
69. Only if it’s from a sender that I trust. 
 
70. Don’t open it if it’s an unknown email address.  
 
71. Look at the email first. 
 
72. Wouldn’t open it unless I was expecting an email of this nature.  
 
73. If I knew the person and was expecting an email.  
 
74. Open the attachment, only if PDF.  
 
75. Check if I know the sender and if I was expecting the email.  
 
76. Do not click on attachment.  
 
77. Depending who it is from, I would open it. 
 
78. If email looks real click on attachment.  
 
79. If it is identifiable to me then I will open the attachment, however if looks like an 
unusual email, I will not open it.  
 
80. Open it depending on who it was from. 
 
81. Depends on the context of the email. If its relevant, then I would open it.  
 
82. Depending on the legitimacy of the email and the name of the hyperlink would 
influence whether or not I click on it.  
 
83. Leave it. 
 
84. Look at the attachment if the email seems legit. 
 
85. Probably open it. 
 





87. It depends who it’s from. If it’s from an unknown person I will most likely not open 
it unless there is a message explaining the attachment.  
 
88. If it from someone I know I’d open it, if I don’t know them, I’d leave it. 
 
89. Open it if it’s from an account that I recognise, unless it seems unlikely for them 
to send it (hacked).  
 
90. Open it? Why wouldn’t you? Unless it looked illegitimate.  
 
91. Open it if I recognised who it was from.  
 
92. Do not click on the attachment.  
 
93. Depends who the email was from, but probably not open it. 
 
94. I would open it dependent if I know who it was from if not I would ignore I delete 
email.  
 
95. I would check the email, depending on who it is from I would view the 
attachment.  
 
96. Depends what the email is. 
 
97. Delete it if I recognise it to be a phishing email.  
 
98. Depends on who it is from, if it is from a recognised or trusted source, I would 
open it.  
 
99. If from an unknown account, not open it.  
 
100. If the sender is unknown, ignore. 
 
101. Depending on who it was from i.e., secured and trusted I would open it. If I 
wasn’t sure I would leave it.  
 
102. Depends who it’s from... Either open or delete. 
 
103. Open it.  
 
104. If I didn’t recognise the email address then I would delete. 
 
105. If it was from an unknown source then I would leave it and delete it. 
 




107. I usually check the sender or name to see if it can recognised it or any 
spelling mistakes or unnecessary information is present in the email.  
 
108. Double check the sender email address and not open the email if I’m 
unsure. 
 
109. If it is from someone I don’t know I would ignore it. 
 
110. See and ensure I know who it’s from before opening. 
 
111. Unless from a trusted source I would not click.  
 
112. Check who it’s from and report it if seems dodgy.  
 
113. Depends who it’s from i.e., government.  
 
114. I would not open the attachment until I know that the sender is not a 
scammer/I’d look up the sender’s email.  
 
115. Depends if it relevant to me. 
 
116. See who it is from and if it is 100% to click on it. 
 
117. Always click on it if it is from a trusted address, but if it’s an unknown 
website I’m unsure of I will google them and make a decision from there.  
 
118. Look at who sent it and if it is someone reliable, I would open it.  
 
119. Check who the email is from and see if it is a trusted sender, also see 
what the attachment is about. 
 
120. Ignore the email. 
 
121. Look who sent it.  
 
122. Depends if I’m expecting an email. I wouldn’t open it otherwise.  
 
123. I wouldn’t open it unless I know who it’s from or I was expecting it.  
 
124. If it’s a spam email I would just delete it.  
 
125. Unless it’s clear that this is a legitimate email, I would not click it.  
 




127. Nothing wouldn’t open. 
 
128. It depends who the email was sent by. 
 
129. Be aware when opening it. 
 
130. If I didn’t know the sender, then not open the link and report as spam. 
 
131. Depends what the email is about? 
 
132. Depends on who’s it’s from if I didn’t know them- I wouldn’t open it.  
 
133. Depends whether it’s something important to me?  
 
134. I would only open an attachment if I knew where it was from. If I wasn’t 
sure I would ask the person it was from.  
 
135. Depends on who sent the email. If I trusted it I would open.  
 
136. Depending on what website, I would probably ignore it. 
 
137. Yes/No. Depending on the sender.  
 
138. Not open it if I do not know the sender. 
 
139. Open it.  
 
140. Probably open the attachment.  
 
141. Never open it. 
 
142. Ignore it, attachment would be a virus.  
 
143. Depends who from. 
 
144. Ignore it if it’s something I’ve shouldn’t be getting an email.  
 
145. Open it depending on the sending. 
 
146. Depending on where the email was from, I would maybe not even open 
the email.  
 
147. Think if it is worthy of opening and if it is real thing. 
 
148. Depending when I received them inbox, open and if it’s in inbox I will 




149. Depends if I know the sender or was expecting an attachment. If it was 
from a friend I would check the validity of it first.  
 
150. Check that I know who it is from. 
 
151. I would not open as I would not know what I would be opening. 
 
152. I don’t usually, open them.  
 
153. Not open it. 
 
154. Check the email address was real.   
 
155. Search around online to see if it’s legit. 
 
156. Open it depending on who sent it to me. 
 
157. I wouldn’t open it, unless I 100% knew what and who it’s from. 
 
158. Unless the email is from a trusted source I wouldn’t open it.  
 
159. Ignore it and delete the email. 
 
160. If I do not know who has sent the email. I will not open the attachment.  
 
161. Unless marked important I wouldn’t open it.  
 
162. I wouldn’t open it unless I recognise the email/ if I am expecting to receive 
an email.  
 
163. Don’t click on it. 
 
164. Open it if it was from a known source or sender but delete if not.  
 
165. If it’s from a source I know is trusted, then I would open them. If from 
unknown source I’d disregard the email.  
 
166. Unless you know the sender/the reason the email was send don’t click the 
attachment.  
 
167. Generally, open it as it most likely may mean something. They can’t hack 
me from opening an attachment.  
 




169. Don’t look or download it.  
 
170. Depends on the email and the attachment. 
 
171. Open it to see what the attachments show.  
 
172. Open the attachments.  
 
173. Just open the attachments. 
 
174. If it’s from someone I don’t know I wouldn’t open it as I don’t trust them. 
But I would open it if it’s from a family/friend or an official company.  
 
175. Depends where it’s from. If I didn’t expect to get it I’d ignore/delete. 
 
176. Depending on who’s it’s from I would either open it or ignore it. 
 





Appendix G: Question 6 Students Response Data  
 
 
1. I am not sure what these terms mean.  
 
2. Not giving out personal information or bank details etc  
 
3. Don’t open anything you are unsure about  
 
4. Double check the message.  
 
5. Protect my personal information. Be aware of suspicious information. 
 
6. I don’t know.  
 
7. Block number/ Don’t give out email.  
 
8. Do not give number out to dodgy sites or companies or people.  
 
9. I don’t know.  
 
10. Don’t give your number out, only give my email when necessary.  
 




12. Blocking some sites.  
 
13. Do not open from unknown websites.  
 
14. Don’t open links from emails/ texts you do not know.  
 
15. Verify the email address or the phone number and if not don’t answer. 
 
16. Block the recipient email address to save anymore emails from being sent.  
 
17. Block the email if received a phishing email to prevent further. 
 
18. I am not sure.  
 
19. Only open if I trust the sender. Don’t give my email/number.  
 
20. Avoid buying things or signing up to illegitimate websites. 
 
21. Don’t give your email out to people that don’t tell you they are not going to share 
your information.  
 
22. Not giving out email/number to unknown sources.  
 
23. I don’t know.  
 
24. Refrain from putting personal details (number, email etc) on websites etc. 
 
25. Higher security measures.  
 
26. Don’t sign up for spam email or give out your details to many organisations- check 
if they share your info with third parties.  
 
27. Don’t open links from things you don’t know.  
 
28. Only open emails from trusted sources.  
 
29. Delete them.  
 
30. Don’t give your number out to every company and give to third party.  
 
31. Block the emails.  
 
32. I would not open or respond to the emails.  
 




34. Not open anything I don’t know.  
 
35. Check emails and messages before opening them.  
 
36. Be careful which emails I open.  
 
37. Ignore them only talk to the company if I contact them through genuine 
addresses/phone number.  
 
38. Don’t give out emails/numbers.  
 
39. Do research it what to look out for and be less trusting of everything sent to you.  
 
40. Not sure what to do.  
 
41. Don’t know.  
 
42. Don’t give out details online.  
 
43. Always check before paying and if you are not sure don’t even open them.  
 
44. I’m not sure.  
 
45. Not open mail by unknown emails.  
 
46. Don’t sign up to random websites.  
 
47. Not giving personal info to company I don’t trust to avoid the situation. Or just 
ignore them.  
 
48. Not sure.  
 
49. Don’t know what I would do.  
 
50. Not writing your email on websites.  
 
51. I don’t know.  
 
52. Do not open emails/calls/text, block them?  
 
53. Don’t sign up to things online and don’t click links.  
 
54. Check the sender. Have them send to spam.  
 




56. Block the sender or set up option to place all unusual emails in junk mail.  
 
57. Be aware of what these would look like.  
 
58. Always double check the company, email, texts and could phone up the company 
if unsure.  
 
59. Block emails and text if this carries on then keep blocking and ignoring.  
 
60. I don’t really know what phishing means.  
 
61. I don’t know what the terms mean.  
 
62. Never heard of any of them.  
 
63. Don’t open unknown emails/SMS.  
 
64. Not sure.  
 
65. I do not know.  
 
66. Not sign up to things or put email into online sign ups.  
 
67. Use an artificial email address.  
 
68. Not open unknown emails or emails in spam folder.  
 
69. Not click on unknown links.  
 
70. Google if these links are legit. 
 
71. Fines and imprisonment for scamming.  
 
72. Sign up for the IPS and do not click on unverified emails.  
 
73. Only open emails from people I know.  
 
74. Do not open emails if they seem weird.  
 
75. Be careful where you put your email. 
 
76. I am not quite sure.  
 




78. Delete them and block them. 
 
79. Check and read before giving information.  
 
80. Check and read before disclosing information.  
 
81. Spam filter.  
 
82. Not clicking on links and replying until you are certain its real.  
 
83. Not click on attachments unless I know sender or know the content is legitimate.  
 
84. Unsure what to do.  
 
85. Delete your email account or send specific emails to spam. 
 
86. Virus protection. Change email.  
 
87. Not sure.  
 
88. Just don’t click on random links and ignore them.  
 
89. Unsure, maybe avoid entering your email address into websites unless needed.  
 
90. Ignore the emails and do not link on any links.  
 
91. Put them in my junk.  
 
92. Report any phishing emails that I had obtained.  
 
93. Purchase a security or safeguarding program or select certain emails to be marked 
as spam.  
 
94. Keep email private.  
 
95. Don’t know.  
 
96. I have no idea what these are.  
97. Be careful where you put your contact info.  
 
98. Opt out of having email address to be sent to me.  
 
99. Don’t give out your email, phone number to random people and select no to when 
they ask to pass your details onto other people.  
 




101. I don’t know. 
 
102. I don’t know. Never been taught or told?  
 
103. Don’t open from websites you don’t know.  
 
104. Avoid dodgy websites, block the number/emails as soon as receiving. 
Redirect unknown emails to junk.  
 
105. Don’t go on random sites and input personal data.  
 
106. Avoid going on dodgy websites that could lead you to have your details 
taken.  
 
107. Only open messages you know who they are from or are expecting the 
email.  
 
108. Looking for unusual names and email contacts and number. Any spelling 
mistakes on text, have some protection on your devices. Don’t give out personal 
information.  
 
109. Always check with friends and family when unsure and never click on a link 
when you are uncertain.  
 
110. Those kind of emails/text happen if you are not cautious on the internet.  
 
111. Be vigilant for fraudulent emails etc. Maybe install a form of software to 
detect phishing emails.  
 
112. Click the provider, spelling, what it’s asking for, fonts. Report and don’t click 
on links.  
 
113. Block known phishing email addresses.  
 
114. Block emails and senders/numbers.  
 
115. Do your research on the sender. Do not pay or click on links before knowing 
who you are dealing with.  
 
116. Be aware and see if they are legit.  
 
117. Always be aware who is contacting you if unsure google them, and never 
give our sensitive information online unless it’s a trusted website.  
 




119. Don’t give out personal information to not trusted websites and check who 
is sharing your data with 3rd parties.  
 
120. Don’t go on dodgy websites.  
 
121. Just don’t open, answer anything you are not expecting from a legitimate 
company and don’t ever give out details.  
 
122. Research links you get sent and get knowledge on what each of these are.  
 
123. Block/report spam emails.  
 
124. Be extra vigilant and use common sense. Block any emails/addresses that 
you have previously received phishing from.  
 
125. Don’t open them.  
 
126. Don’t give out email address randomly. Don’t open dodgy links 
 
127. Don’t. give out personal info if unsure.  
 
128. Google the link to see if people have had problems.  
 
129. Keep an eye on who’s sending them and not opening unknown links.  
 
130. Don’t give out your phone number to websites etc. 
 
131. Don’t give your details out to unknown websites.  
 
132. Delete/Don’t open/ignore.  
 
133. Having spyware on the device to filter these out.  
 
134. Do not give out email/phone number etc.  
 
135. Don’t give out details.  
 
136. Unsubscribe from their emails.  
 
137. Do not give your email address away.  
 
138. Not sure.  
 





140. Block any future phishing emails.  
 
141. Read terms and conditions and not allow them to share my information.  
 
142. I have a software that deals with it.  
 
143. Not signing up to random sites, change passwords regularly. Keep email 
private.  
 
144. Be more cautious.  
 
145. Be aware of your orders.  
 
146. Check which emails I actually open.  
 
147. Don’t even open the email when I got it and delete.  
 
148. Don’t give them if you don’t know the source.  
 
149. Spam filter.  
 
150. Be extra careful not open things you don’t know who they’re from. 
 
151. Don’t answer and ads that you might not know and any websites that are 
not trusted.  
 
152. Verify the number and if you are unsure contact the recipient its from.  
 
153. Do not know.  
 
154. Do not click etc that don’t seem real.  
 
155. Have a better security signature like a VPN.  
 
156. Don’t give out your email/phone number to websites that are not trusted.  
 
157. Avoid giving out your details.  
 
158. I don’t understand the question.  
 
159. If you don’t know the number calling/texting or the place/person an email 
has come from don’t answer.  
 




161. Have different passwords for different accounts. Put them in spam so they 
only appear in junk.  
 
162. Try not to sign up to unreliable websites.  
 
163. Don’t give email to dodgy websites and don’t click links.  
 
164. By having a spyware program installed that identify and filter out those kind 
of emails.  
 
165. Don’t give out email on websites, don’t open unknown sources.  
 
166. Avoid emails from senders who have no reason to be emailing you.  
 
167. Report emails that seem phishy- also don’t open attachments.  
 
168. Set up settings to avoid any future messages from unknown people.  
 
169. Don’t know.  
 
170. Spam filter change email received settings. 
 
171. I am not sure.  
 
172. Don’t know what to do to be honest.  
 
173. Delete.  
 
174. Not sure.  
 
175. Make a note of email addresses you know or know of and check if an email 
you got is from that list or not.  
 
176. Make sure these types of emails go straight into spam or junk. And I would 
read properly who sent the email and the email itself.  
 
177. Block dodgy emails.  
 
 
 
